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INTRODUCTION 
Tarzan, Betty Boop, Sam Spade, Scarlett O’Hara, James Bond, 
Harry Potter, Holden Caulfield, Sherlock Holmes: the mere names of 
these once-litigated figures evoke the market power and popular 
significance characters can possess. Characters are “cultural heuristics,” 
with the power to transport, amaze, horrify, and inspire.1 Once readers 
come to know a character, they may want to spend time with her again 
and again. The experience of reading about a character may deliver 
many of the same sensations and emotions as a social interaction with 
her in a reader’s real life would do.2 Narrative fiction has a unique 
ability to provide a set of simulated experiences for a reader to live out 
in her mind.3 It is perhaps this signature feature that can make reading 
so intensely emotionally engaging. 
Characters are central to that experience of engagement, for 
reasons that are not entirely understood. Readers can know a character 
even more profoundly than they can know a human being, perhaps 
because of narrative techniques that invite readers into characters’ inner 
lives.4 Readers become deeply attached to “their” characters. In the 
words of one literary theorist, “[e]ven though readers know perfectly 
well that fictional characters are make-believe, they go on caring about 
them, lending them the bodies that they do not possess, feeling with 
them in emotional fusion that paradoxically calls into embodiment a 
psychic corporeality vouched for in readers’ own bodily responses.”5 
It is not uncommon to hear readers complain that when a book 
ended, they were sorry to part with its characters, as though they had 
 
 1 BLAKEY VERMEULE, WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT LITERARY CHARACTERS? 52 (2009). 
 2 Annie Murphy Paul, Your Brain on Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, at SR6. 
 3 Id. (“Fiction—with its redolent details, imaginative metaphors and attentive descriptions 
of people and their actions—offers an especially rich replica. Indeed, in one respect novels go 
beyond simulating reality to give readers an experience unavailable off the page: the 
opportunity to enter fully into other people’s thoughts and feelings.”). 
 4 Rita Felski, Introduction, 42 NEW LITERARY HIST. v, v–vi (2011) (“[V]ia the specifics of [a 
character’s] formal shaping, it offers otherwise unattainable insights into the historical 
inflection of personhood.”). 
 5 Suzanne Keen, Readers’ Temperaments and Fictional Character, 42 NEW LITERARY HIST. 
295, 309 (2011). 
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literally spent time with them as actual persons. As a function of that 
sense of connection, readers may compare themselves to a favorite 
character, emulate or critique her, empathize with her, or imagine her in 
new settings or stories.6 Readers who are also authors may subsequently 
struggle to situate a favorite character in their own works of fiction, 
perhaps in tribute or perhaps in defiance.7 In these ways, characters 
seem to exist autonomously, that is, apart from their original works and 
authors. Characters could be said to run—as a neuroscientist described 
the process of reading—“on minds of readers just as computer 
simulations run on computers.”8 In a fundamental way, then, characters 
lead independent lives in their readers’ imaginations, in subsequent 
works of literature, and in the public sphere.9 That a personality may be 
termed a Lothario, a Don Juan, or a Casanova attests to how fictitious 
characters can be so memorable and enduring—perhaps notorious, in 
these examples—that they become archetypes that circulate almost 
autonomously in the cultural economy. 
Paradoxically, it may be this very autonomy that makes characters 
valuable to their creators as commodities in their own right, apart from 
the original works in which they appear.10 For authors, characters may 
be the most valuable aspects of an artistic work whose financial success 
is difficult to predict and may be fleeting.11 Creating enduring characters 
 
 6 Id. at 306. 
 7 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural 
Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 601–12 (2007) (describing 
and defending defiant uses); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a 
New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 655–60 (1997) (describing, generally, fan 
uses as tribute and critique). 
 8 Paul, supra note 2. 
 9 Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note, Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating A Legal Space for 
Culturally Appropriated Literary Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 905 (2007) 
(“[L]iterary characters . . . exist within the narrative as the focal point for human identification. 
In the present cultural milieu, today’s readers, as tomorrow’s writers, are twisting and 
refashioning iconic literary characters to reflect their own insights and identities.”). 
 10 Leon Kellman, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 25 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 3 (1958) 
(proclaiming that “[t]he fictional character today is perhaps the most important commodity in 
the entire field of entertainment in the United States.”). If this was true in 1958 at the time of 
this Article’s publication, it is even truer today. Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the “Summer of 
the Spinoff” Came to Be: The Branding of Characters in American Mass Media, 23 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 301, 302 (2003). Characters generate billions of dollars in revenue annually for 
intellectual property owners. Melanie Warner, How a Meek Comic Book Company Became a 
Hollywood Superpower, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at C7; see also Michael Todd Helfand, Note, 
When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to 
Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 625 (1992). 
 11 It would be more appropriate, of course, to refer to owners as well as (or instead of) 
authors, given the way copyright law structures its entitlements. However, this Article is 
concerned with the incentive effects on authors of protecting their characters, and the impact of 
such protection on subsequent authors. The Article thus uses “authors” in lieu of “owners” in 
most circumstances. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 216 F.2d 945, 949 
(1954) (finding that authors reused characters in order to generate readerly momentum (or 
“snowball”) in the reception for their works); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of 
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increases the likelihood that audiences will buy subsequent works. 
Subsequent works in which characters star may change, but the 
characters themselves often remain effectively the same. Characters’ 
value to authors derives in substantial part from their capacity for 
potential perpetual reuse in new works.12 Yet their value to the reading 
public and to subsequent authors derives in large part from their ability 
to live multiple lives beyond the limited horizons of their original 
authors. Characters are, in a sense, unique among components of an 
artistic work because they can be removed from the work for the 
purposes of starring in other works.13 This may be the major reason that 
characters become the subject of copyright litigation: they appear to be 
leading lives in works beyond their original ones.14 Yet it is arguably the 
very ability of characters to lead lives separate from their original works 
that makes them such a valuable form of legally cognizable property, 
thus ironically threatening their independent legal existence as cultural 
signifiers. The law reflects this tension between characters as freely 
circulating cultural signifiers, and characters as legal property whose 
circulation is subject to their owners’ granting permission. 
Unfortunately, while copyright law plays an important role in 
allocating rights to the use of characters, the law in this area is very 
unclear. Character jurisprudence is thought to be muddled and 
“quixotic”; neither “predictable nor fair.”15 Courts have been vague or 
 
Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429, 432 (“Characters such as Sherlock Holmes, Tarzan, 
Falstaff, Superman, James Bond, Pogo, Peter Rabbit, the Bobbsey Twins, Nancy Drew, Travis 
McGee, and Mickey Mouse may be better known and more valuable than any particular work 
in which they appear.”).  
 12 Goldberger, supra note 10, at 302 (“Although other aspects of a work can be reused to 
create new works, it is the character that is most portable and most profitable. Characters such 
as James Bond, Hercule Poirot, and even Bart Simpson transcend any one work in which they 
appear. The thing that makes them so valuable is that they can appear over and over again in a 
variety of media. With these brand name characters, the ability to use them in derivative works 
is even more valuable than the right to sell any one particular work.”). 
 13 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.11.3, at 158 (1989) 
(“Unlike most paintings, photographs or novelty items, a character can take on a life of its own 
and thus may be protected against copies in postures, settings and attitudes far removed from 
any in the author’s original depiction.”). 
 14 Sometimes owners litigate characters because subsequent authors’ characters are 
substantially similar, though not identical, to the original characters. But this typically happens 
when an entire work’s ideas and structure are at issue. The situation in which independent 
character protection is at issue is when the characters alone have been borrowed and 
repurposed. 
 15 See, e.g., E. Fulton Brylawski, Protection of Characters—Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 77, 87 (1974); Kurtz, supra note 11, at 437 n.49; Leonard Zissu, 
Whither Character Rights: Some Observations, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 121 (1981); Kathryn M. 
Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 
41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 926 (2009) (“[C]opyright protection for fictional characters 
[is] . . . riddled with uncertainty and inconsistency as courts have struggled to fit fictional 
characters into the rubric of copyright law.”); Helfand, supra note 10, at 651 (describing how 
doctrinal confusion undermines the policy goals of copyright law). The case law’s problems 
receive fuller treatment infra Parts II, III. 
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mistaken in their decisions to adopt certain thresholds for character 
protect-ability, and conclusory in their determinations that characters 
are—or are not—copyrightable.16 Judgments often seem to reflect real-
world factors or legal areas other than copyright, yet legal reasoning 
takes place on the terrain of copyright as though faithful to the law, thus 
entrenching the doctrinal confusion. 
Beyond the confusion internal to copyright’s protection of 
characters, a further source of confusion lies at the boundary between 
copyright and trademark, where sometimes character owners make 
claims for overlapping protection.17 Litigants typically bring claims 
under both sets of laws, whether or not the claims are equally 
meritorious. Trademark law extends to some characters, and though its 
protection is narrower in scope and more expensive, it is an important 
source of legal protection for characters, substantial enough doctrinally 
and economically to justify a fuller discussion elsewhere. By contrast, 
copyright protection benefits owners by being broad in scope, by arising 
automatically upon the character’s fixation in a work of art that qualifies 
for copyright protection, and by being comparatively inexpensive.18 
Many character cases feature both kinds of claims, and because courts 
have not historically paid enough attention to the differences between 
the two intellectual property regimes,19 the case law has evolved in a 
doctrinally haphazard fashion.  
Although the problem of proper channeling, or the improper 
convergence of forms of intellectual property protection, is a serious 
issue muddying the doctrinal waters around characters, this Article 
focuses on problems arising internally within copyright protection 
alone. It does so in order to address fundamental antecedent questions 
of the nature of characters and the relationship between characters and 
their works. It also argues that a better understanding of the purpose 
and flaws in copyright protection for characters could help disentangle 
copyright from trademark, thus alleviating some of the tensions in the 
jurisprudence of both areas of intellectual property law. 
Towards that end, this Article argues for the benefits of an 
interdisciplinary approach to the problem of copyright’s internal 
 
 16 See, e.g., Brylawski, supra note 15, at 87; Foley, supra note 15, at 921. 
 17 In fact, characters can be protected under copyright law, trademark law, state law 
misappropriation law, unfair practices and deception law, and, in some cases, the right of 
publicity. In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the court held that a book’s contents 
could merit both copyright and trademark protection. 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(reasoning that “[b]ecause the nature of the property right conferred by copyright is 
significantly different from that of trademark, trademark protection should be able to co-exist, 
and possibly to overlap, with copyright protection”); Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: 
Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 433 
(1994); see also Foley, supra note 15, at 953–57; Helfand, supra note 10, at 651. 
 18 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 439–40. 
 19 Foley, supra note 15, at 964; Helfand, supra note 10, at 651. 
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inconsistencies. Character jurisprudence under copyright law misaligns 
with cultural and literary conceptions of character. Intellectual property 
law has taken insufficient account of important discrepancies among 
legal, cultural, and literary theories of character. Literature helps 
articulate what is at work in the doctrinal tensions in copyright’s 
character jurisprudence over which kind of character, if any, to protect 
independently, and how much of it, if any, to protect separately from the 
text. At the heart of the doctrinal confusion over the proper scope of 
protection for characters are a series of questions that literature can help 
answer: what is a character, and how can the law identify it as such? Can 
characters truly be protected independently of the work that embeds 
them, and if so, how much of the character should the law protect as 
such? What method should courts use to separate characters from their 
texts, for the purposes of assessing whether unauthorized uses of 
characters in new creative works constitute infringement? To whom do 
characters belong, and when? What should the law make of the role 
readers play in constructing, completing, and resuscitating characters? 
As the confused case law makes plain, the law does not have good tools 
to answer these questions, even though the factual scenarios at stake in 
litigation continue to press courts for solutions. 
The turn to literature yields insights into the proper scope not just 
of character protection, but also more broadly of the derivative work 
right, which scholars have cited as an important area for copyright 
reform.20 In clarifying the law’s doctrinal confusion, literary 
considerations can provide one piece in the larger puzzle of copyright 
reform. Ultimately, they can also help inform the inquiry into whether 
copyright or trademark, or neither, is proper for character protection. 
Part I sets out the purpose and evolution of protection for fictional 
characters under copyright law.21 It describes the dominant tests used to 
 
 20 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 551, 564 n.88 (calling for the clarification of the derivative work right); Tushnet, supra 
note 7, at 651. 
 21 This Article excludes from consideration protection for human characters, to which 
other forms of law such as the right of publicity, may attach. Fictional literature is not directly 
concerned with human characters, and this Article concerns itself with fictional characters. See 
Gregory Currie, Narrative and the Psychology of Character, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 
61, 61 (2009) (bracketing human characters who appear in fiction so as to focus productively on 
fictional characters’ role in narrative); Zissu, supra note 15, at 121 (“The historical or actual 
figure, living or dead, is not the subject of our inquiry. Such figures are not fictional even when 
presented fictitiously in the sense that the author gave unduly free rein to his imagination 
instead of adhering to facts.”). For consideration of the intellectual property concerns involved 
with human characters, see, e.g., Leslie A. Kurtz, Digital Actors and Copyright—From The Polar 
Express to Simone, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 783, 785 (2006) (exploring 
answers to the questions: “What is the legal status of . . . electronic actors . . . digital human 
actors? Unlike traditional cartoon characters, like Mickey Mouse, they are derived in some 
fashion from human beings. But they are created, in large part, by those employing digital 
technology. Who owns legal rights to these hybrid creations?”); Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional 
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determine whether characters will be independently protected, and 
discusses the confusion that has arisen in the law. Part II addresses the 
proper scope of protection for characters by broadly tracing the 
evolution of characters through literary history. Literary history, 
theories, and texts demonstrate that the very factors that gave rise to 
characters’ centrality to modern literature may be the factors that make 
protecting them independently under copyright unworkable. After 
providing this literary background, Part II frames what the Article terms 
the “entanglement” problem. Starting in the eighteenth century, 
characters began to become more important, for readers and for 
markets.22 As characters rose in importance, I argue, they also became 
harder to extricate from their texts, for the purposes of treating them as 
independent pieces of intangible property under copyright law. Their 
disentanglement is a necessary, but inconsistent and often conclusory, 
part of copyright analysis that invites too much manipulation of the 
substantial similarity analysis. Part III argues that in spite of copyright’s 
stated commitment to aesthetic neutrality, the law surrounding 
characters is not neutral and will never be neutral. Copyright 
encourages and rewards the creation of visually rendered (or visually 
evocative) characters over literary (or purely verbal) ones. The law 
encourages the creation of what literary theory terms “flat” rather than 
“round” characters. Literary theory thus exposes the reductive nature of 
the law’s treatment of characters, and its simplistic view of the proper 
scope and implementation of independent copyright protection. 
Literary theory also points to another legal problem regarding copyright 
protection for characters: to the extent that readers play an important 
role in receiving and construing characters, thus “mentally completing” 
them, perhaps such characters cannot be seen to have satisfied 
copyright’s fixation requirement. Recent case law exploring the fixation 
requirement supports the idea that a work that undergoes constant 
change after the artist has completed it may fail to clear the fixation 
threshold. In the case of characters, the text in which the characters 
appeared would receive protection, in its fixed textual form, and its 
characters, as embedded in the work as mere collections of words, 
would be protected as part of that text. But the particular role readers 
play in adopting and engaging with and changing characters would 
effectively bar protection for characters independently of their 
originating texts. Thus, characters would no longer receive independent 
copyright protection. Part IV concludes by turning to alternatives the 
 
Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
355 (1998). 
 22 See, e.g., DEIDRE SHAUNA LYNCH, THE ECONOMY OF CHARACTER: NOVELS, MARKET 
CULTURE, AND THE BUSINESS OF INNER MEANING (1998); VERMEULE, supra note 1. 
SAID.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2013  9:47 AM 
776 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:769 
 
law might weigh in response to literature’s insights, and it provides a 
brief overview of the possibilities in both copyright and trademark. 
The Article concludes that copyright law would do well to take 
account of the ways in which literary texts and theories reveal characters 
to be much more complicated than copyright law currently 
contemplates. Although literary insights into character do not 
themselves require either expansion or contraction of protection—
dependent as reforms are on policy concerns endogenous to 
copyright—they do fundamentally change the nature of the inquiry. 
These insights expand the law’s understanding of characters and 
highlight theoretical and doctrinal implications of the confusion 
currently stymieing character protection under copyright law. 
I.     COPYRIGHT PROTECTS SOME CHARACTERS INDEPENDENTLY OF THEIR 
WORKS 
This Part provides background on the scope and nature of current 
copyright protection for characters. It reframes the de facto purpose of 
protection for independent characters as a gap-filling measure to be 
used when regular substantial similarity tests between texts would fail to 
produce an accurate result. It describes the two dominant tests for 
character copyrightability, and argues that copyright law has set the 
stage for a systematic aesthetic bias in favor of protecting certain kinds 
of characters by relying on tests that are unclear, difficult to implement, 
and blind to the role characters actually play in fiction and in literary 
creation. Literature shows why copyright’s current analytic structure 
with respect to characters is bound to remain flawed unless it changes. 
A.     Copyright Protection for Characters 
The 1976 Copyright Act (hereinafter the Act) grants authors of 
“original works of authorship”23 a bundle of rights in order to encourage 
them to “create and disseminate original expression.”24 Authors possess 
the exclusive right to copy, perform, distribute or display their works, 
and to create what the law terms “derivative works.”25 Derivative works 
are subsequent works of authorship that are based on preexisting 
works26 or that incorporate characters or component parts from 
 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  
 24 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 
(1996). 
 25 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 26 Id. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
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preexisting works.27 Thus, parties may infringe the rights of original 
authors in their copyrighted works in a number of ways: by 
reproducing, displaying or performing the works verbatim, or 
distributing them without authorization. When character details in a 
story are borrowed verbatim as part of the unauthorized copying or 
distribution of the entire and exact preexisting work, courts do not need 
to reach the question of whether the characters are independently 
copyrightable.28 This is because a subsequent work that is “substantially 
similar” to a preexisting work will be found to be infringing unless a 
successful defense is available.29 
By contrast, when character details from one work are used in the 
creation of an otherwise new work—such as an unauthorized sequel or 
spinoff—the allegedly infringing work would fail the substantial 
similarity test for purposes of proving copying because the old and new 
works would look too dissimilar. It is typically then that courts tackle 
the question of whether copyright subsists in the independent character, 
and has been infringed.30 The only common feature in the two works is 
the character. The old character might be said to have taken on a life of 
her own in a new work.31 Copying characters can thus serve as the sole 
basis of an infringement claim, regardless of whether anything else in an 
allegedly infringing work is “substantially similar” to a preexisting work. 
 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work 
of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”). Using intellectual property terms of art—such as 
“original” and “derivative works”—unintentionally connotes subtle but unhelpful value 
judgments about the works under discussion. Thus, whenever possible, this Article has adopted 
the term “source work” or “preexisting work” where copyright law has tended to use “original 
work” and “subsequent work” rather than “derivative work.” 
 27 King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding that 
copyright protection extends to all copyrightable component parts of a work in which copyright 
subsists). 
 28 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[2] (2013) 
(“Where there is literal similarity . . . it is not necessary to determine the level of abstraction at 
which similarity ceases to consist of an ‘expression of ideas,’ because literal similarity by 
definition is always a similarity as to the expression of ideas.” (footnote omitted)). 
 29 Defenses might include, inter alia, independent creation or fair use. The doctrine of 
independent creation was summed up in Learned Hand’s classic formulation: “[I]f by some 
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he 
would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they 
might of course copy Keats’s.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d 
Cir. 1936); see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (codifying the doctrine of fair use); Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (holding that fair use is an affirmative defense, thus 
placing the burden of proof with the proponent); 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:49 (4th ed. 2002) (“Fair use is an affirmative defense.”). 
 30 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12; see also Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1450 
(1988) (reaching substantial similarity analysis with respect to characters after stating that there 
was “little similarity” between the works at bar “in terms of overall plot, sequence, dialogue or 
setting”). 
 31 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 432. 
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For example, if Shakespeare’s works were protected by copyright, 
an unauthorized “prequel” to Hamlet—in which he and Ophelia eloped 
to the Danish countryside before the revenge tragedy ever ignited, for 
instance—might contain a number of substantial similarities to the 
underlying work. A court might find that some protectable aspects of 
Shakespeare’s expression were taken, as well as some protectable plot 
incidents. If, in a second hypothetical work based on Hamlet, Hamlet 
and Ophelia were instead imagined as college freshmen in Elsinore, 
Idaho, in a transposition of their thorny courtship into a setting and 
time far removed from its original context, substantial similarity 
analysis between this campus romance and the underlying play would 
likely fail to find copying on the basis of the works’ structures and 
settings. The two works would look too different from each other.32 
However, independent character protection under copyright might still 
reach this subsequent work. 
One way of viewing character protection then, is as a de facto gap-
filling measure: courts use it to fill what they may perceive as a gap in 
protection when subsequent uses of characters from preexisting 
copyrighted works extend beyond the bounds of substantial similarity 
analysis but a considerable use of preexisting materials has nonetheless 
taken place.33 In this hypothetical, a court would return to Hamlet to 
assess, as always under copyright law, whether ownership of a valid 
copyright exists and whether defendants copied plaintiffs’ work.34 Direct 
evidence of copying is rarely available, so plaintiffs may show (a) that 
defendants had access to the copyrighted material from which they 
allegedly copied and (b) that “substantial similarity” existed between 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ works.35 
A court that found no substantial similarity between the overall 
works would then likely ask whether Hamlet and Ophelia were 
copyrightable as independent characters, and if so, only then would ask 
whether the subsequent work had impermissibly borrowed protected 
parts of the underlying work’s characters.36 The inquiry into character 
copyrightability would begin, in most courts, with an examination of 
 
 32 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding no 
infringement because “[t]he stories are quite different” from each other); accord Olson, 855 
F.2d at 1450–51 (“The settings of the two works are too dissimilar to be relevant to the issue of 
substantial similarity.”). 
 33 Plaintiffs must show that defendants copied “a substantial, legally protectable portion” of 
plaintiff’s work. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 
(C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 34 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 35 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162–63 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
 36 Olson, 855 F.2d at 1451. 
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“the degree to which the character is developed.”37 The analysis would 
consider the characters’ physical descriptions, linguistic tendencies or 
catchphrases, relationships with other characters, and emotional traits.38 
For example, does the western mountain Ophelia sing songs about 
“herbs” (or their modern-day pharmacological equivalent)? Does the 
contemporary Hamlet act moody, melancholic, and indecisive? Does he 
quote from or “remix” lines from the pre-existing Hamlet’s soliloquies? 
The examples given above differ from the standard infringement 
case, in that they both borrow a recognizable element from an 
underlying work, to do something creative with it. Put otherwise, the 
hypothetical unauthorized prequel and college love story imagined 
above both differ in an important way from an infringing use that 
merely copied parts or all of Shakespeare’s work verbatim, to avoid 
working up something fresh. Scholarship has called for a clearer 
distinction between these two kinds of infringement: copying and 
creative reuse.39 This Article adopts the distinction between copying and 
creative reuse, and concerns itself with the second kind of infringement 
alone: reuse of characters through the creation of original derivative 
works, which is important in its own right40 and can usually be 
distinguished from mere copying quite easily.41 
Creative reuse plays a much more important role in character 
jurisprudence than mere copying, which makes sense as a logical 
proposition. If a second author simply copies a work outright, he will 
have copied characters along with the rest of the work’s defining 
features. If a second author seeks to build something fresh using the 
 
 37 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 443 F. Supp. 291, 301 
(1977). 
 38 Note that the lack of clarity about precisely which aspects to include for the purposes of 
substantial similarity analysis is part of the doctrinal confusion, as discussed fully, infra Part II. 
 39 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2538, 2557 
(2009) (recognizing that some “iterative copying” may be fair use but highlighting that such 
cases differ from regular copying because of their “orthogonal,” “speech-related purposes,” and 
arguing that fair use determinations ought to be built on such distinctions through the ex ante 
creation of “policy-relevant clusters”); Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 
7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 323 (2009) (arguing that a distinction should be 
drawn between the verbatim copying and distribution of preexisting works, and the creation of 
derivative works based on those preexisting works); cf. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED 
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 25 (1967) (“It may be objected that Romantic literary ideas have little 
relevance to the class of pedestrian, nonimaginative works which was the main subject of 
copyright litigation. But this category cannot be marked off clearly from the other; and the 
courts traditionally have not been careful to distinguish the various classes of works on 
functional grounds.”). 
 40 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 473 (“Allowing authors to make productive use of an existing 
character, for new artistic purposes, seems more important than allowing others to make copies 
of a work.”). 
 41 Cf. id. (“[I]t is difficult to separate the hack’s piracy of another’s character, aimed at 
nothing more than benefitting from the efforts of others, from the truly creative use of 
character to produce a new effect.”). 
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seeds of an earlier work, what he will frequently do is lift the characters 
out of the first work and begin from that starting point. Setting aside 
character licensing and termination of assignment cases, the typical 
character infringement case focuses on creative reuse, rather than 
copying, since that is the scenario in which independent protection 
might conceivably exist. Note though, that the emphasis on characters’ 
independent copyrightability often bogs courts down in discussions of 
the characters themselves, as opposed to the similarities between 
characters, and the truly important inquiry: whether infringement has 
occurred.42 As a result, copyright protection for characters has 
expanded; as Jessica Litman has written: “It used to be said that 
characters were themselves uncopyrightable (and it was never really 
true, but it was often said); today nobody would even say it.”43 
B.     Copyright’s Competing Purposes and Internal Limitations 
Contemporary scholarship frames copyright’s purpose in largely 
utilitarian terms.44 The United States Constitution authorizes Congress 
to pass copyright legislation to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”45 The goal of such protection is thus forward-looking: it 
purports to provide incentives for authors to create works of art they 
might not create if they feared appropriation of those works for private 
gain by others.46 Anthony Trollope wrote, “Take away from English 
authors their copyrights, and you would very soon take away from 
England her authors.”47 Trollope’s hyperbolic sentiment calls attention 
to one of the central goals of copyright law: to provide incentives for 
 
 42 Id. at 440. 
 43 Litman, supra note 17, at 430 (footnotes omitted). 
 44 See Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 242 (1991). “[A] nod to 
economic incentives is obligatory in contemporary copyright scholarship, and the assumptions 
that underlie an incentive-based model have become part of the common language in which 
copyright scholars speak.” Id. Though other theories justifying copyright exist, the utilitarian 
theory predominates. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–12 
(1982); cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006). 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 46 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (agreeing with the characterization of 
copyright law’s purpose as a system that delivers “an incentive to create” by providing 
“assurance of fair compensation for [artists] and their heirs”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with the services rendered.”). 
 47 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 439 n.62 (citing 1 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
142 (1883)). 
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authors to create works. However, not all authors are treated equally 
under copyright, which prioritizes authors under a kind of first-in-time 
property rule. If authors use material from pre-existing works, copyright 
law presumptively requires that they seek permission or be prepared to 
offer fair use as an affirmative defense.48 
To counterbalance the preference for prior authors over 
subsequent authors, copyright law limits authors’ rights in their works 
with respect to both duration and subject matter. These restrictions 
serve the public’s constitutional interests and offer some protections for 
subsequent authors. The effective monopoly granted by copyright exists 
only for a limited duration, after which all rights in the work revert to 
the public, and the work falls into the public domain.49 Inherent in 
copyright’s system of incentives is that authors’ rights must to some 
extent be weighed against subsequent authors’ rights.50 In its seminal 
creative fair use case, the Supreme Court referred to the balance of 
authors and subsequent authors as an “inherent tension in the need 
simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others to 
build upon it.”51 Fair use exists to provide some “breathing space” for 
authors who wish to build on preexisting building blocks in creating 
their works of art.52 
Copyright protection for characters similarly contains several 
internal limitations. These standards for legal protection may make 
sense at a distance, but when examined up close, they reveal that 
negotiating the contours of copyright protection in characters is a good 
deal more difficult than lawmakers and authors might wish.53 For 
example, some uses of protected characters may qualify as “fair uses” 
and some characters will simply fail to qualify for copyright protection 
ab initio, perhaps because they are stock characters, uncopyrightable 
ideas rather than copyrightable expression.54 Congress built important 
limitations into the subject matter of copyright in the form of the 
 
 48 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 
1998) (holding that authors presumptively have the broad exclusive right to create sequels). 
 49 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 7–
8 (2d ed. 1981). Determining length of duration can be a complex matter that can vary with the 
work’s date of creation and publication, as well as its ownership, but the general rule currently 
is that copyrighted works are subject to a term of protection for the life of the author plus 
seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). This limited duration used to consist of fifty years, but 
Congress extended copyright protection by twenty years with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 108, 203, 301–04) (hereinafter CTEA). The extension has been unsuccessfully challenged as 
making copyright unconstitutionally long. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186. 
 50 Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 51 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
 52 See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429 
(2007). 
 53 See Kurtz, supra note 11, at 462; Foley, supra note 15, at 927. 
 54 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
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idea/expression dichotomy and the related merger doctrine. Under the 
idea/expression doctrine, copyright will not subsist in anything that is 
merely an “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery.”55 The Act limits protection to 
expression of an idea; the underlying idea itself is excluded from 
protection.56 Relatedly, the scènes à faire doctrine stipulates that stock 
characters, plot devices, and textual incidents may not be protected.57 
For example, characters that are mere types, such as the clown, the 
Machiavel, the jealous husband, or the ingénue, will not be protected as 
such.58 The merger doctrine limits copyright’s scope still further: if a 
particular work consists of expression that would otherwise be 
protected, the merger doctrine prevents its copyrightability if the 
expression is one of a very limited number of ways an idea may be 
expressed.59 By extension, then, if a character consists of an idea whose 
expression is limited to one of very few possible modes of expression, 
those forms of expression will not be protectable even if they do go 
beyond being merely the stuff of “ideas.” A number of doctrines thus 
impose natural limits on protection for characters: unless they go 
beyond being mere stock characters, and can also survive review under 
the merger doctrine, they do not merit protection. They fall outside the 
statute’s scope because they are mere “ideas.”60 
Copyright’s scope and its purpose are meaningfully intertwined: to 
the extent that Congress was willing to grant authors a monopoly 
property right in the fruits of their labor, it did so only by attaching 
numerous limitations. These limitations, from constitutional text 
(“limited times”) to common law doctrines later codified (such as fair 
use and the idea/expression dichotomy) are important for the 
discussion of copyright in characters. Because characters live on beyond 
their works, creating inspiration for subsequent readers and authors, 
they give rise to what could be extraordinarily powerful rights with 
substantial impact on parties other than owners. Copyright should 
attend carefully to the proper scope of independent copyright protection 
 
 55 Id. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1879) (holding that bookkeeping was a 
“useful art” or idea protectable by patent, but not by copyright, protection under which was 
limited to the expression of that idea). 
 56 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding that “[u]nlike a patent, a copyright 
gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the 
idea—not the idea itself”). 
 57 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Leslie A. Kurtz, 
Copyright: The Scènes à Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79 (1989). 
 58 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (“If a drunken old bum were a copyrightable character, so 
would be a drunken suburban housewife, a gesticulating Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a 
talking cat, a Prussian officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, [and] a masked 
magician.”). 
 59 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 58–59 (D. Mass. 1990). 
 60 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 650. 
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for these fictional figures. In particular, the threshold for character 
copyrightability is unclear, and benefits from sustained analysis. 
C.     Tests for Character Copyrightability 
Copyright protection for characters independent of the protection 
for the works in which they appear arose at common law, with Judge 
Learned Hand’s opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.61 The 
Copyright Act does not categorically protect characters as independent 
pieces of property the way it protects works such as literary works, 
musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes, choreographic works, 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures, sound 
recordings, and architectural works.62 Instead, characters were 
historically protected as elements within a larger work.63 Before Nichols, 
it was assumed that characters received copyright protection as part of 
the works in which they were embedded.64 For example, if a first work 
(say, Herman Melville’s Moby Dick) were copied in some respects by a 
second work (say, Sena Jeter Naslund’s Ahab’s Wife, or The Star Gazer), 
Melville might proceed against Naslund on the theory that her work 
infringed the copyright in his work. The elements infringed upon would 
be determined by the court’s substantial similarity analysis. In this 
 
 61 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 62 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 63 The Copyright Act does not provide specific protection for characters as a category 
independent of the works in which they appear. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, characters 
were found protectable as component parts of copyrightable works in which they appeared. 
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (referring to the protection 
extended to “all the copyrightable parts of the work copyrighted”); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103; see 
also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing § 3 of the 
Copyright Act of 1909 and describing characters as “copyrightable component parts of the 
work copyrighted”); Edmund Kitch, Comment on Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya 
Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 41 (2006) (“The statute lists as 
examples of the protected works of an author literary works, musical works, dramatic works, 
pantomimes, choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures, 
sound recordings and architectural works. The statute explicitly excludes from protection any 
‘idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principal, or discovery.’ 
Nothing about characters.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 64 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to the 
characters, quite independently of the ‘plot’ proper, though, as far as we know such a case has 
never arisen.”). Although cases had in fact touched on the copying of characters, none had 
explored independent protection for characters. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns 
Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding cartoon character “Wonderman” infringing 
of “Superman” but assessing the similarities in terms of the characters and their surrounding 
texts, rather than as independent characters); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 
(S.D.N.Y. 1914) (finding a dramatic performance featuring the characters “Nutt” and “Giff” to 
be infringing of a popular cartoon strip’s characters, “Mutt” and “Jeff,” but emphasizing the 
similarities between the two works overall rather than the similarities between the characters 
independently of their texts, and resting the bulk of its analysis on a market substitution 
theory). 
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instance, however, Naslund took less than a paragraph’s worth of 
material directly from Melville’s work.65 Unless this paragraph can 
persuasively be claimed to comprise the heart of Melville’s work, it will 
probably be insufficient to give rise to a finding of substantial 
similarity.66 Nichols clarified that characters could merit protection 
independently of their works: here, Melville could sue even though 
Ahab’s Wife is, as a work, dissimilar from Moby Dick, simply because 
Naslund had used and repurposed a character, Una Spenser, from Moby 
Dick. 
Nichols created independent copyright for characters, but limited 
the scope of such protection to exclude poorly developed characters. 
Judge Hand held that to qualify for independent protection, characters 
would need to be “distinctively delineated.”67 The distinctive delineation 
test set out in Nichols has become the de facto majority approach in 
copyright’s character jurisprudence. For all the opinion’s importance, 
however, Nichols has never been adopted so completely as to eliminate 
other tests for character copyrightability. The main alternative 
approach, laid out half a century ago by the Ninth Circuit, has been 
critiqued possibly as roundly as the Nichols opinion has been praised.68 
In the “Sam Spade” case, the Ninth Circuit found that Dashiell 
Hammett (and Knopf, his publisher) had not impliedly assigned away 
rights to use of the famous detective he had created, Sam Spade.69 In 
allowing Hammett to continue to use his best-known character in 
current and future works, the court rested mainly on contractual 
grounds.70 Yet like the Nichols court, it also took the opportunity to 
reflect in dicta upon what sorts of works should give rise to independent 
copyright protection for characters.71 The court concluded that 
characters could not be independently copyrighted unless “the character 
 
 65 Stacey D’Erasmo, Call Me Una, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at C7. 
 66 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). 
 67 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can be 
copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”). 
 68 On the view that the Sam Spade case got it wrong, see KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51 n.44 
(calling the case “wide of the present mark,” and calling “some of its observations on the 
question of ‘characters’ . . . surely wrong”); see also Brylawski, supra note 15, at 87 
(characterizing the analysis in the case as “productive of uncertainty and mischief,” and as an 
“unintelligible verbal formula . . . the seed from which massive confusion has grown”). Indeed, 
in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, the Court openly raises the critiques of its earlier case. 345 
F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 69 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 
1954). 
 70 Walt Disney, 345 F. Supp. at 111. 
 71 The court was unclear, later, whether the “constitutes the story being told test” was 
properly part of its earlier holding, or only, as it stated, “arguably dicta.” Olson v. Nat’l Broad. 
Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451–52 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoted in 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12 n.13.1). 
The Air Pirates Court treated this standard for copyrightability as “an alternative rationale,” 
suggesting greater power over the court than if it found the language to be dicta. 1 NIMMER, 
supra note 28, § 2.12 n.13.1. 
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really constitutes the story being told.”72 Sam Spade and other 
characters from The Maltese Falcon were merely “vehicles” through 
which the story was conveyed; “if the character is only the chessman in 
the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection 
afforded by the copyright.”73 
Subsequent courts and commentators have claimed that the Sam 
Spade case sets the bar for copyrightability so high that it effectively 
denies any characters independent protection,74 and the author of 
perhaps the most highly respected copyright treatise calls the test “much 
too restrictive.”75 At least one court cites it for the proposition that 
“characters ordinarily may not be copyrighted.”76 Whether or not the 
test makes sense on its own merits, it would seem to have been ill-
applied in the Sam Spade case, in which the court found that the 
detective did not constitute the story being told. One observes a certain 
irony in that the Court seems to have granted Hammett the right to use 
his characters, but potentially stripped all future characters of 
independent copyrightability in so doing.77 Still, the “constitutes the 
story” dicta—if they are indeed dicta—linger in the case law despite the 
lambasting the relevant language has undergone.78 Some courts have 
made a point of addressing both standards,79 presumably to avoid 
reversal.80 
Independent copyright protection for characters thus requires that 
characters satisfy one of two main tests, the “distinctive delineation test” 
(used by a majority of courts) or the “constitutes the story being told” 
test.81 Besides these two formal tests courts use to determine characters’ 
independent copyrightability, there are numerous informal factors 
 
 72 Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 950. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See DOROTHY J. HOWELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES AND THE PROTECTION OF 
FICTIONAL CHARACTERS 90 (1990) (stating that the Sam Spade case “is frequently cited to 
support the proposition that character is uncopyrightable”). 
 75 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12 n.12; see also Kurtz, supra note 11, at 454 (calling the 
test “very restrictive, far more restrictive than the Nichols standard”). 
 76 Olson, 855 F.2d at 1451 (emphasis added). 
 77 David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in 
Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990); Kurtz, supra note 11, at 455 (“The 
author [was] left free to use his character in new stories, but so [was] everyone else.”). 
 78 Foley, supra note 15, at 930 (describing courts’ uncertainty over Sam Spade’s effective 
authority, and stating that it “has never been generally accepted”). 
 79 “In an implicit acknowledgment of the unsettled state of the law, in considering the 
characters at issue in Olson, the circuit court evaluates the characters in the suit under both 
tests.” Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 
1989). 
 80 Foley, supra note 15, at 930. “[O]ut of an abundance of caution this Court will determine 
the protectability of the Rocky characters under both tests.” Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *7. 
 81 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 
1954); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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courts may also consider.82 Some courts address both tests, producing 
confusion and unpredictability. The law in this area is inconsistent, 
unsettled, and unclear.83 
As the next two Parts show, the haphazard evolution of copyright 
protection for characters has culminated in uncertain and aesthetically 
non-neutral standards for protection. Courts routinely add elaborations 
of degree or actual additional factors as requirements for 
copyrightability.84 This lack of clarity affects crucial aspects of the scope 
of protection. The next two Parts turn to the larger theoretical and 
cultural implications of copyright’s current treatment of literary 
characters, and literature’s capacity to shine light on the doctrinal 
confusion. Literature can show how copyright protection for characters 
is problematic in three ways: how much of the character is protected, 
which characters are protected, and whether characters should be 
protected at all, if they are not “fixed” for the purposes of copyright law. 
First, the law is unclear in regards to the outer boundaries of the 
character it protects: the scope of protection is thus difficult to discern. 
This is the character entanglement problem. Framed another way, which 
parts of an independent character belong to the character, as opposed to 
the text? Which parts are plot, which parts are style (itself largely 
unprotected under copyright law if unaccompanied by other elements85) 
 
 82 Under the “extrinsic test” for substantial similarity, courts look at whether subsequent 
works use the character’s name, mannerisms, physical likeness (whether verbally or graphically 
rendered), signature props or disguises, patterns of speech, and so on: The analysis is based on 
objective qualities discernible to experts if not always to the average reader/viewer. Anderson, 
1989 WL 206431, at *12. As part of their inquiry into the nature of the use made by defendants 
and the importance of the preexisting work to the subsequent work, courts also look at whether 
the characters are eponymous, whether the characters were borrowed in whole or in part, 
whether they were borrowed literally, figuratively, allusively, or transformatively, etc. 
 83 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (“The law in the Ninth Circuit is unclear as to when visually-depicted 
characters such as James Bond can be afforded copyright protection.”); Anderson, 1989 WL 
206431, at *7 (calling the law “unsettled”); Mark Bartholomew, Protecting the Performers: 
Setting a New Standard for Character Copyrightability, 41 SANTA CLARA. L. REV. 341, 347 
(2001) (referring to the “lack of clear standards” the case law evinces); Brylawski, supra note 15, 
at 77 (calling character doctrine “inconsistent, unclear, and quixotic”); Kurtz, supra note 11, at 
437. 
 84 Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that 
characters in the Ninth Circuit had been granted protection but only when they were “especially 
distinctive”) (emphasis added); Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215–
16 (1998); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 111 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 
(characterizing earlier cases as requiring that characters be “sufficiently distinctive and defined” 
to merit protection), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 85 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). I read 
Steinberg to stand for the proposition that style by itself will not suffice for a finding of 
infringement. In Steinberg, and other cases similarly focused on authorial style, there is usually 
a great deal of overlapping subject matter. In Steinberg, the movie poster and The New Yorker 
cover were stylistically similar, but a court did not need to decide whether style alone was 
protectable because what had been borrowed was much more than style: The two works 
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and which parts are distinctive character traits that constitute protected 
expression?86 Second, characters are governed by legal standards that 
are not value-neutral, which in turn skews the outcome regarding which 
characters can and will be protected. We might call this the law’s 
selection problem. Third, copyright law continues to protect characters 
independently even though theories of reading—and empirical 
evidence—show that literary characters actually change and evolve in 
the minds of readers. Awareness of character’s evolution through 
reading would suggest that, beyond their existence in words on the page, 
characters may fail to meet copyright’s fundamental requirement of 
fixation. This is the character fixation problem. 
Together, the next two Parts demonstrate that using a literary lens 
to view the doctrine underpinning independent copyright for characters 
magnifies and clarifies the law’s confusion, which in turn should allow 
legal regulators to focus more accurately effectively on ways to improve 
the law. 
II.     WHY THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CHARACTERS IS 
UNCLEAR 
How much of a given character does—and should—the law 
protect? How can courts discern where the text leaves off and the 
character begins, for the purposes of substantial similarity analysis? 
Ultimately, the answers to these questions implicate the nature and 
scope of the derivative work right and could play a valuable role in 
copyright reform. However, they are important in their own right as 
procedural levers in copyright litigation.87 This Part argues that literary 
insights should be brought to bear on considerations of the proper scope 
of protection for independent characters. Copyright can use literature to 
think through whether more, or less, of a character should be protected 
as a character, by inquiring into the extent to which characters can be 
easily separated from their surrounding works. 
 
captured a provincial view of a big city, with many substantive similarities that went well 
beyond style. For more discussion, see infra notes 166–172 and accompanying text. 
 86 Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 711–12; KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51 (referring to the “trouble 
in extricating ‘character’ as a separately copyrightable element” and noting that some have 
viewed the extricability of various features of a text all too blithely). 
 87 The amount and importance of the material taken from a work plays a role in courts’ 
substantial similarity analysis as well as in the second prong of fair use analysis, the amount, 
and substantiality of the portions used. 
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A.     From Flat to Round to Unfixed: A Phylogenic Account of Characters 
Literary texts show us that characters, as a group, and authorial 
techniques used in representing characters, have evolved a great deal 
over time. Authors have found new narrative ways, since at least the 
early modern era, to show readers that characters may be conflicted or 
divided, or to step inside and then back outside characters’ minds, in a 
process that Blakey Vermeule calls “mind-reading” and another 
canonical book on narrative refers to as “peering directly into the 
[character’s] mind.”88 Some have argued that their evolutionary 
progress is (or was), stalled.89 Still, no one would deny the tremendous 
change in what James Phelan calls characters’ “dimensions” 
(characteristics) and “functions” over the many centuries of recorded 
literary representation.90 The very techniques that make them highly 
complex–narrative forms that were once experimental, such as interior 
monologue, stream-of-consciousness, or free-indirect style–also make it 
much more difficult to disentangle characters from their texts.91 This 
Part offers a few representative examples of such narrative experiments 
and illustrates their relationship to the question of a character’s 
disentanglement from her surrounding text. 
Before launching into further discussion of character 
disentanglement, a disclaimer is in order. This Article necessarily 
uses broad historical brushstrokes rather than attempting in vain to 
convey the transhistorical, transgeneric particulars of characters. 
Conceding that it overgeneralizes in doing so, the Article nonetheless 
relies on a handy temporal division: characters before the early 
modern period were, with few exceptions, stock characters.92 The 
 
 88 H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 67–82 (2d ed. 
2008); see also VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 63, 75 (“The history of literary forms is punctuated 
by . . . changes designed to get inside the mind and go along for the ride. . . . Writers are always 
coming up with new ways of getting inside”). SCHOLES, PHELAN & KELLOGG, infra note 106, at 
175. See generally DORRIT COHN, TRANSPARENT MINDS (1978). 
 89 MARY MCCARTHY, Characters in Fiction, in ON THE CONTRARY 271, 275 (1961) 
(describing the evolution of narrative approaches to creating characters, and lamenting the 
crisis in representation she perceives: “[novelists] are stuck in the phylogenesis of the novel”) 
(alteration in original). 
 90 James Phelan, Thematic Reference, Literary Structure, and Fictive Character, 48 
SEMIOTICA 345, 357 (1984). 
 91 ABBOTT, supra note 88, at 75, 78. 
 92 Consider as one significant example, Homer’s Iliad, which presents a rich case for 
inferring historical differences in the representation of character. (“[B]ecause so many different 
personages figure in the Iliad, each attributed with a distinct psychological characterization, the 
Iliad is . . . a display of character and characterizations…and [an] intriguing text for tracing 
ancient personality.”). Constantinos G. Passakos & Boele De Raad, Ancient Personality: Trait 
Attributions to Characters in Homer’s Iliad, 7 ANCIENT NARRATIVE 75, 83 (2009). The work 
names over 700 characters (including gods). Id. at 82. Yet “Homer does not seem to be 
particularly interested in the psychological nature of man; there is no explicit psychology by 
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state of literary study is so diverse, and so rich in history, it would be 
impossible to capture the full range of critical perspectives that have 
existed. Recently, however, there has been a notable resurgence of 
interest in the topic of character, mobilized in part by theories of 
readers’ responses, cognitive psychology, and a turn to affect in critical 
theory.93 It is with full awareness of more recent critical moves, then, 
that this Article turns to a somewhat old-fashioned taxonomy, 
according to which, following E.M. Forster, characters could be classed 
as “flat,” or round. The latter are more fully psychologized characters 
that tend to populate much contemporary literature and drama.94 
Forster defined flat characters as personalities “constructed round a 
single idea or quality: when there is more than one factor in them, we 
get the beginning of the curve towards the round. The really flat 
character can be expressed in one sentence . . . .”95 Such characters are 
easy to recognize,96 and easy to remember.97 They remain comfortingly 
similar despite changes in their circumstances, which help them to seem 
frozen in time as the book itself ages.98 They may never be taken 
seriously, for though they make appeals to the emotions, they tend to 
prompt laughter and to be associated with comedy.99 
Round characters, by contrast, are unpredictable, difficult to 
summarize or recognize at a glance: 
The test of a round character is whether it is capable of surprising in 
a convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. If it does not 
convince, it is flat pretending to be round. It has the incalculability of 
life about it—life within the pages of a book.100 
Characters such as these strike readers as more surprising, more 
complex, more dynamic, and more human. They are harder to fix in the 
mind, and harder to remember because they evolve throughout their 
works.101 Unlike flat characters, which appeal to the emotions, round 
 
which Homer understands his characters. He seems to be an observer of the behavior of the 
heroes, describes what they do, which decisions they take, and what they accomplish.” Id. 
 93 Felski, supra note 4, at v–vi. 
 94 MCCARTHY, supra note 89, at 277. 
 95 E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 67–68 (1955) (coining the terms “flat” and 
“round” characters). 
 96 Flat characters are “easily recognized whenever they come in—recognized by the reader’s 
emotional eye, not by the visual eye, which merely notes the recurrence of a proper name.” Id. 
at 68. 
 97 Id. at 69. 
 98 Id. (“[T]hey were not changed by circumstances . . . which gives them in retrospect a 
comforting quality, and preserves them when the book that produced them may decay.”). 
 99 MARY E. RAGLAND, RABELAIS AND PANURGE 41 (1976). 
 100 FORSTER, supra note 95, at 78. 
 101 A round character, unlike a flat one, exhibits change when difficult situations befall her. 
She “passe[s through great scenes] and [is] modified by [them. In turn, readers] do not 
remember her so easily because she waxes and wanes and has facets like a human being.” Id. at 
69. 
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characters appeal to the intellect.102 They are perhaps rightly considered 
the hallmark of modern literature. 
Though flat characters can appear in the modern era—indeed, they 
tend to populate mass-market literature—they constituted the dominant 
mode of representation during the earliest centuries of literary 
representation.103 Some examples of individualized characters do 
predate the modern era: Odysseus stands out as a highly particularized 
figure whose famously recognizable scar is perhaps the outward 
manifestation of his uniqueness.104 But examples of classical or pre-
modern highly individualized or psychologically complex characters are 
rather more uncommon, and this is reflected in the narrative function 
assigned to them, to the names authors chose for them, and to the 
relationship they bore to their textual predecessors.105 
Another, slightly less stark way of distinguishing between earlier 
and modern characters is loosely to classify the former as static and the 
latter as dynamic. Early characters are often static: they do not evolve 
during the course of their narratives, even though they may undergo 
trauma or experience difficulty, as, say, Achilles and Odysseus do.106 In 
this sense, they are flat in Forster’s terminology. Modern characters are 
more dynamic. Dynamic characters undergo change, although they may 
do so in ways that are very predictable, and follow a path that conforms 
to external plot factors, or they may do so in idiosyncratic, 
psychological, or irrational ways. Dynamic characters that evolve 
according to the dictates of plot or moral allegory are known as 
“developmental” characters, and dynamic characters that evolve in 
individualized fashion across narrative time, are known as 
“chronological” characters.107 The dynamic character category thus 
bifurcates into developmental characters, which are similar to flat 
characters that undergo change purely for plot purposes, and 
chronological characters, which are round, in that they evolve over time, 
as humans do. Developmental characters are simplistic; they may 
change during the course of their narrative, but only “so as to clarify 
 
 102 RAGLAND, supra note 99, at 41. 
 103 IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL: STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON AND FIELDING 15 
(1957) (enumerating historical changes paving the way for the rise of the novel: “To begin with, 
the actors in the plot and the scene of their actions had to be placed in a new literary 
perspective: the plot had to be acted out by particular people in particular circumstances, rather 
than, as had been common in the past, by general human types against a background primarily 
determined by the appropriate literary convention.”). 
 104 ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE 
5, 476 (1971). 
 105 See, e.g., JOEL FINEMAN, SHAKESPEARE’S PERJURED EYE: THE INVENTION OF POETIC 
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE SONNETS (1986); WATT, supra note 103, at 17. 
 106 ROBERT SCHOLES, JAMES PHELAN & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 169 
(2006). 
 107 Id. at 169–70. 
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[their] progress along a plot line which has an ethical basis . . . .”108 
Chronological characters are complex, “highly mimetic,” and 
sophisticated. They represent the difference in narrative representations 
of, to borrow from Forster, “life by values” versus “life by time.”109 
It would be very difficult to summarize the full range of character 
taxonomies that have over time been proposed in literary scholarship, 
and trying to summarize all the critical responses to those would be 
more challenging still. The sheer number of approaches—mythic, 
structuralist, religious, allegorical, ethical, psychoanalytical, 
psychological, feminist, and so on—dazzles. The various taxonomies 
discussed here focus on classifying characters into groups that copyright 
law might be able to use as part of identifying its own foibles. These 
taxonomies can contribute value even if they only hint at the complex 
stratification that has evolved in literary theory in tandem with literary 
history. Characters have been considered many different things at many 
different times, and been variously pronounced of utmost interest, or of 
no interest, along the way. Though artificially simplifying, it is helpful to 
draw one particular line, between early characters and modern, or 
contemporary, characters. 
For a considerable part of early literary history, characters were 
understood across many cultures and languages as stock tropes upon 
which small variations could be overlain.110 Their flatness did not make 
them lesser characters, or their readers “dupes;” these characters simply 
belonged to different forms of reading, different social and intellectual 
modes that can be more clearly understood outside the system of 
mimetic representation.111 Indeed, in Aristotle’s Poetics, he subordinates 
them almost entirely to plot and structure.112 One could say that 
characters were mere structures, or actors, within the work’s larger 
structures.113 Agents were necessary to carry out the plot, but 
individualization of any kind could be added after the fact.114 Characters 
were heroes or villains (or gods) mobilized into action by (other) gods, 
by externally dictated duties, or by dramatic imperatives.115 There was 
little of the self-exploration, vacillation, dividedness, or depth that the 
 
 108 Id. at 169. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 164. 
 111 LYNCH, supra note 22, at 10–11. 
 112 ARISTOTLE, POETICS 24 (N.G.L. Hammond trans., Museum Tusculanum Press 2001) 
(Advising would-be authors: “[w]hen the general [plot] outline is completed and not before, 
one should add the names, expand the story and insert the episodes . . . .”); see also RONALD S. 
CRANE, THE LANGUAGES OF CRITICISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY 73 (1953). 
 113 The echo of the Sam Spade opinion’s “vehicles of the story being told” dicta bears 
mentioning, and receives fuller treatment. See supra Part I.C. 
 114 SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION AND 
FILM 109 (1978). 
 115 Id. at 108–10. 
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modern reader has come to associate with the depiction of characters.116 
To be effective, classical characters did not need to be complex, only 
virtuous and consistent.117 During this pre-individualized era, characters 
were reducible to types—mere names even—to be inserted around the 
structural components of the story.118 
However, between the Renaissance and the eighteenth century, 
characters evolved a great deal, with respect to both depth and 
complexity. Around the early modern period—some scholars have 
argued that Shakespeare deserves the credit or serves as a point of 
origin119—characters became more atypical, more introspective and 
sophisticated.120 In other words, characters began to shift from being 
organized by “type” to being organized by “individual.”121 One sub-
genre demonstrates this paradigm shift neatly: the character sketch.122 In 
the seventeenth century, a literary genre emerged in the form of the 
character sketch, which began to associate the meaning of “character” 
with the depiction of particular personalities, rather than merely with 
general virtues and vices of character associated with earlier classical 
literature.123 The character sketch originated with Theophrastus, a 
student of Aristotle and author of a set of thirty brief but witty sketches 
 
 116 Recall by comparison that the early novel can be characterized as subordinating “plot to 
the pattern of the autobiographical memoir,” manifesting its insistence as an emerging genre on 
“the primacy of individual experience . . . .” WATT, supra note 103, at 15. 
 117 ARISTOTLE, supra note 112, at 27 (stating, in his chapter 14, entitled “Character”: “[i]n 
regard to character the playwright should have four aims . . . the characters should be 
good. . . . characters should be appropriate. . . . characters should be like to those which 
tradition portrays, and this is different from making the character good and appropriate in our 
sense of the words. . . . [and] characters should be consistent. Even when the subject of the 
representation is inconsistent and affords an inconsistency of character, he should still be 
consistently inconsistent.”). 
 118 Uri Margolin, Characterization in Narrative: Some Theoretical Prolegomena, 67 
NEOPHILOLOGUS 1, 2 (1983) (referring to instances in which characters were plot devices, or 
mere “architecture”). 
 119 WATT, supra note 103, at 17 (arguing that such individualized representation could be 
but was not always found in Shakespeare; by contrast, it was everywhere to be found in the 
“narrative manner of [modern novels]”). 
 120 HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY xxvii–xxviii (2d ed. 
1997) (“Falstaff, Hamlet, and Iago are creators of language, while Shakespeare, by their means, 
created us. . . . [M]ore than any other writer, or any other person that we know of, thought 
everything through again for himself. Shakespeare did not think one thought and one thought 
only; rather scandalously, he thought all thoughts, for all of us. . . . The issue is not belief but 
our human nature, so intensified by Shakespeare as to be his re-invention.”). 
 121 David Venturo, The Satiric Character Sketch, in A COMPANION TO SATIRE: ANCIENT AND 
MODERN 561 (Ruben Quintero ed., 2007) (describing why the character sketch began to lose its 
force as a form of typology). 
 122 The character sketch originated with the ethical parables of the ancient Greeks, including 
Tyrtamos of Lesbos, commonly known as Theophrastus. CHARACTER WRITINGS OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (Henry Morley ed., 1891). 
 123 ARISTOTLE, supra note 112, at 27. 
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that marked a new form of “literary portraiture.”124 The Theophrastan 
sketch served as the model for many generations of authors of character 
writings, and it held particular interest for writers in England and 
Europe during the Enlightenment.125 
The evolution of the character sketch based on general and 
abstracted virtues or vices to the more particularized biographical 
character portrait reflected a significant epistemological change. What 
Ian Watt has called the rise of “[t]he concept of realistic particularity” 
came with narrative features that, as the Article shows below, have 
important implications for copyright policy.126 David Venturo notes the 
“shift from constructing character sketches deductively, in order to 
illustrate a trait or ethos, to constructing them inductively, based on a 
writer’s knowledge, preferably direct and empirical, of the individual he 
is seeking to draw.”127 
This epistemological shift from deductive to inductive character 
rendering attests to the greater importance placed on individualizing 
aspects of character.128 It also underscores the new kind of work being 
done by characters, and the new sorts of expectations with which 
readers increasingly encountered characters.129 Characters became 
newly individualized. From texts populated by figures described in 
terms of structural roles, exterior surfaces, or discernable attributes—
such as the Icelandic sagas, for example—narrative witnessed a shift to 
the evocation of particularized figures with increasingly developed 
 
 124 Jeffrey Rusten, Introduction to THEOPHRASTUS, CHARACTERS 5, 8, 9 (Jeffrey Rusten & 
I.C. Cunningham, eds., 2002). His characters typically began “X man is the sort who” and then 
described a personality flaw with vivid examples drawn from fourth-century BCE Athens. As 
an example of the sort of portrait Theophrastus drew, under “Overzealousness,” Theophrastus 
offers eleven annoying character traits, including: “(1) You can be sure overzealousness will 
seem to be a well-intentioned appropriation of words and actions. The overzealous man is the 
sort (2) who gets up and promises to do things he won’t be able to carry out . . . (5) He tries to 
stop fights even between strangers to him. (6) He leads the way down a path, but then can’t find 
the way to where he is going.”). Id. 
 125 See J.W. SMEED, THE THEOPHRASTAN ‘CHARACTER’ 47 (1985) (dedicating a monograph 
to the influence Theophrastus had on writers including, among many others, Thomas 
Overbury, Joseph Hall, John Earle (in seventeenth-century England), and La Bruyère (whose 
Les Caractères De Théophraste Traduits Du Grec, Avec Les Caractères Ou Les Moeurs De Ce 
Siècle (1688) is an acknowledged classic and an influential work in its own right)). 
 126 WATT, supra note 103, at 17. 
 127 Venturo, supra note 121, at 561. 
 128 Earlier models of deductive character analysis had drawn on general traits or didactic 
principles of behavior to create composites that stood for a given personality. These moved 
from the general, to the specific. Later models in the inductive tradition moved from specific 
personalities to depictions of character that could be used to adduce something more general 
about human nature, or a given moment in history. In other words, they harnessed the specific 
to gesture to the general. 
 129 LYNCH, supra note 22, at 6. 
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interiors that were hidden from view, but knowable, in part, by 
readers.130 
By the eighteenth century, characters had assumed a singular 
importance in their works131 and in the literary market.132 Character 
sketches were used as political satires in fiction, but they had also 
become a “staple” in non-fiction narrative works.133 The role for 
characters to play in narratives of all sorts had by the eighteenth century 
grown quite significant. Characters, it would seem, were everywhere to 
be found. Public reception magnified the role characters did and could 
play.134 Whether characters dominated the title and plotlines, or simply 
found themselves, even as bit players, to be the focus of newly detailed 
descriptions (“sketches”) novelists began to place throughout their 
works, characters and their personalities had taken on new 
importance.135 Some works of fiction consisted solely of compilations of 
character portraits.136 
The rise of the novel, and especially the psychological novel, 
correlated with the growing interest in character, since this form was 
perhaps uniquely interested in exploring personality.137 In turn, the 
emphasis on characters may also be traceable to the rise of mimesis, or 
realism, in literary representation, and the new forms of narrative 
 
 130 SCHOLES, PHELAN & KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 172 (“Saga characterization is an 
almost pure and perfect example of the external approach to character. . . . But the sagas never 
attempt to penetrate inside the character. Only words and actions are described; thoughts are 
never analyzed.”). The monolithic nature of this characterization holds true for the epic genre 
also. Id. at 173. 
 131 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 50. 
 132 See also LYNCH, supra note 22, at 5 (describing the rise of a new “economy of characters” 
thus: “Literary character’s history thus converges . . . with a history that sees writing and 
reading themselves become commercialized, fashionable activities. In this same period, rival 
syndicates of booksellers went to court over literary property, the first circulating libraries made 
books available for hire, and books came to be numbered among the possessible keepsakes and 
knickknacks that people had to learn to use as they learned to personalize the interior spaces of 
their homes and their selves.”). 
 133 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 51; Venturo, supra note 121, at 561. 
 134 For example, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, became a publishing event that permeated 
society, and literary creation, thoroughly. It had been preceded by Richardson’s equally loved, 
imitated, and mocked, Pamela. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 50–51. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Sketches By Boz (1836), by Charles Dickens with illustrations by George Cruikshank, 
provides one such example. CHARLES DICKENS, SKETCHES BY BOZ: ILLUSTRATIVE OF EVERY-
DAY LIFE AND EVERY-DAY PEOPLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1957). The Impressions of Theophrastus 
Such (1879), by George Eliot, provides another. It takes its eponymous character’s name from 
the classic character sketch author, Theophrastus. GEORGE ELIOT, THE IMPRESSIONS OF 
THEOPHRASTUS SUCH xix (Everyman 1995) (“Theophrastus, a Greek philosopher of the late 
third century BC, is regarded as the inventor of ‘character writing’: moral portraits of sundry 
human types . . . .”). 
 137 W.J. HARVEY, CHARACTER AND THE NOVEL 23 (1965) (“[M]ost great novels exist to 
reveal and explore character.”). 
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discourse it popularized.138 The works of modern authors, such as 
Anton Chekhov, for instance, feature more investigation of characters’ 
inner selves than major plot events.139 Henry James and Edith Wharton 
are another two modern authors who similarly emphasized 
psychological states rather than actions with regard to their characters. 
James’s prioritization of character was, for example, distinctly anti-
Aristotelian.140 For James, one might say, plot was an excuse to 
showcase character; for Aristotle, recall, the opposite had been true.141 
Though these modern authors clearly owe a good deal to literary 
precursors with an interest in exploring the representation of selfhood, 
they mark the modern period as a time of considerable emphasis on the 
development and portrayal of character.142 As a function of the growing 
interest in exploring—and reading about—selfhood in narrative, new 
techniques and genres with which to portray personhood arose. 
Seeing the evolution in authorial representations of selfhood 
through a literary lens helps address an underlying symptom of 
copyright’s confusing treatment of characters. That is, as characters 
became more important, they became harder to disentangle from their 
texts, in ways that have consequences for copyright law. 
 
 138 AUERBACH, supra note 104, at 23 (describing Odysseus’s homecoming as a starting point 
for a particular kind of “literary representation of reality in European culture” but showing how 
Homer’s characterization consisted of largely external details); WATT, supra note 103, at 12–13 
(“Modern realism . . . begins from the position that truth can be discovered by the individual 
through his senses . . . The novel is the form of literature which most fully reflects this 
individualist and innovating reorientation. Previous literary forms had reflected the general 
tendency of their cultures to make conformity to traditional practice the major test of 
truth . . . [for] the novel, whose primary criterion was truth to individual experience—
individual experience . . . is always unique and therefore new.”). 
 139 Margolin, supra note 118, at 6; see also CHATMAN, supra note 114, at 113 (“One 
could . . . argue that character is supreme and plot derivative, to justify the modernist narrative 
in which ‘nothing happens,’ that is, the events themselves do not form an independent source 
of interest . . . .”). 
 140 “[I]t was almost always character, and not story, that presented itself first to his 
imagination. But then began the task of shaping and refining the ‘germ’ of his characters so that 
they might fulfill their task persuasively in a story with a certain emotive power.” MARY DOYLE 
SPRINGER, A RHETORIC OF LITERARY CHARACTER: SOME WOMEN OF HENRY JAMES 6 (1978). 
 141 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 142 Chaucer, Boccaccio, and Dante, among many others in the western tradition alone, 
offered versions of character sketches through which Theophrastan influence can be traced, but 
they are also important in the phylogeny of character development in their own right. See, e.g., 
GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO, THE DECAMERON (Mark Musa & Peter E. Bondanella, eds. & trans., 
W.W. Norton & Co. 1977); GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES: FIFTEEN TALES AND 
THE GENERAL PROLOGUE (V.A. Kolve & Glending Olson eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 
2005). 
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B.     Innovation, Complexity, and the Rise of Characters’ Inextricability 
Narrative experiments with form produced several techniques and 
new genres that would be recast as mainstream modes of representation 
by the early twentieth century. These techniques include, among others, 
the soliloquy (or dramatic aside); the dramatic monologue; the interior 
monologue; stream-of-consciousness narration; first-person narration; 
and free indirect discourse.143 All of these arguably heighten the reader’s 
experience of an individualized character; these techniques make 
characters feel more real.144 Authors’ experiments with innovative 
narrative techniques created characters that seemed more nuanced, 
more individualized, and more complex; these characters were rounder, 
to borrow from Forster’s terminology. Narrative techniques, in short, 
made characters more human.145 
In turn, however, these techniques complicated whether copyright 
law can disentangle a character from his text, can distinguish between a 
character and the language used by, about, and around her. Modes of 
creating interiority knitted the character more thoroughly through the 
text and made her less easily extricated from it. In one of the most 
important character cases of the present decade, Salinger v. Colting, the 
court noted the entanglement problem in passing: “It is difficult, in fact, 
to separate Holden Caulfield from the book.”146 
These more complex, more “real” characters could be crafted in 
ways that resisted narrative conventions and seemed to subvert 
conventional types found in earlier literature. Such characters defied, or 
at least played with, readers’ expectations and narrative conventions. 
They often displayed awareness of themselves as characters in a larger 
narrative.147 For example, consider the opening of The Catcher in the 
Rye, narrated by Holden Caulfield: 
 
 143 ABBOTT, supra note 88, at 70. Free indirect discourse or style consists of  
[t]hird-person narration in which a character’s thoughts or expressions are presented 
in the character’s voice without being set off by quotation marks or the usual 
addition of phrases like ‘he thought’ or ‘she said’ and without shifting into 
grammatical first-person discourse: ‘It was a hot day. What on earth was she doing 
lugging stones on a day like this?’ Here, the second sentence is marked by [the 
speaker’s] intonations, but it is cast in the third person and in the past tense, neither 
of which she would use, were she speaking or thinking this question. 
Id. at 234; see also SCHOLES, PHELAN & KELLOGG, supra note 106, at 177–78. 
 144 WATT, supra note 103, at 22. 
 145 Id. at 27 (“The various technical characteristics of the novel described above all seem to 
contribute to . . . the production of what purports to be an authentic account of the actual 
experience of individuals.”). 
 146 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting District Court Hearing (June 
17, 2009) (Hr’g Tr. 24)). 
 147 LAURENCE STERNE, TRISTRAM SHANDY 78 (1966) (“You see as plain as can be, that I write 
as a man of erudition; that even my similies [sic], my allusions, my illustrations, my metaphors, 
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If you really want to hear about it, the first thing you’ll probably want 
to know is where I was born, and what my lousy childhood was like, 
and how my parents were occupied and all before they had me, and 
all that David Copperfield kind of crap, but I don’t feel like going 
into it, if you want to know the truth. In the first place, that stuff 
bores me, and in the second place, my parents would have about two 
hemorrhages apiece if I told anything pretty personal about them. 
They’re quite touchy about anything like that, especially my father. 
They’re nice and all—I’m not saying that—but they’re also touchy as 
hell. Besides, I’m not going to tell you my whole goddam 
autobiography or anything.148 
Holden addresses his allusion directly to the reader, anticipating 
familiarity with David Copperfield. He signals his unwillingness to 
participate in the Dickensian narrative tradition, with its conventions of 
sentimentality, flat characters, and recitation of a character’s 
background.149 Yet in spite of his critique, he delivers such background 
details even as he disavows them. He does so by hinting to the reader 
about his relationship to his parents, revealing his adolescent 
prickliness,150 and undercutting his own words about his father’s 
“touchiness” through his emotionally quicksilver and defensive 
remarks.151 The first-person voice here allows the speaker to situate 
himself within a literary genre, but then to reject its demands. 
Comparing David Copperfield with his own “lousy childhood” creates a 
strong sense of irony and prepares readers for the intermittently tough, 
sarcastic tone with which Holden has become associated in the cultural 
imagination. Precisely because of this exterior toughness, Holden’s 
departures into sincerity and vulnerability constitute the other side of 
his appealing emotional coin. First-person narration allowed authors to 
meld narrative and drama in effective and surprising new ways that 
innovated literary form and offered more highly tailored, individualistic 
depictions of fictional characters. 
Individualizing characters in this way relied on narrative 
experiments that, over time, earned legitimacy as mainstream modes of 
narrative discourse. These techniques, however, also blurred the 
boundaries between text and character. Such narrative innovations 
 
are erudite,—and that I must sustain my character properly, and contrast it properly too,—else 
what would become of me? Why, Sir, I should be undone . . . .”). 
 148 J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 3 (2001). 
 149 Id. (“[T]hat stuff bores me”). See generally VALERIE PURTON, DICKENS AND THE 
SENTIMENTAL TRADITION: FIELDING, RICHARDSON, STERNE, GOLDSMITH, SHERIDAN, LAMB 
(2012). 
 150 SALINGER, supra note 148, at 3 (“I’m not going to tell you my whole goddam 
autobiography.”). 
 151 Note the italics on: “They’re nice and all” and the em-dashes setting off “I’m not saying 
that” as if someone has suggested he has said precisely that. The book shows us, before its end, 
that Holden himself is in fact “touchy as hell.” Id.  
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central to representing character interiority as the soliloquy, first-person 
narration, and the dramatic monologue have many literary benefits, but 
all of them lead to a problem for copyright law. Where does the text end 
and the character begin, if independent copyright protection will cover 
that character? How should courts treat subsequent uses of a character 
whose existence in the original work is first described through means 
that conflate—or seem to conflate—the character with the text? 
Authors sometimes use these self-oriented narrative techniques 
because of the distance they can create between the character and the 
work. Yet sometimes the opposite obtains, and techniques such as these 
actually collapse the distance between character and text. A case in 
point: the soliloquy in Shakespeare’s plays has been shown, at different 
places in his œuvre, and at different moments in literary interpretation, 
both to reveal a character’s selfhood and to obscure it. Sometimes the 
soliloquy poses as a moment of truth personal to the speaker but 
represents “just those moments when the speaker steps out of character 
to make an expository utterance, to speak not for his own particular 
perspective but for the general perspective of the play.”152 The dramatic 
monologue, in Robert Browning’s hands, notoriously puts readers in an 
uncomfortable position as they try to retreat from the moral ugliness 
discernible in his protagonists to higher narrative ground, but find 
nowhere to go.153 Readers find themselves caught between “sympathy” 
for and “judgment” of the speaker.154 To read “Porphyria’s Lover,”155 or 
“My Last Duchess,” is to listen to an unpleasant (homicidal) man 
rationalizing his savagery.156 The pull towards sympathy created by the 
 
 152 ROBERT LANGBAUM, THE POETRY OF EXPERIENCE: THE DRAMATIC MONOLOGUE IN 
MODERN LITERARY TRADITION 160–61 (1957). 
 153 ALAN SINFIELD, DRAMATIC MONOLOGUE 3–5 (1977) (describing readers’ responses to 
Browning’s monologues as falling somewhere between “perplexity and discouragement”). 
 154 LANGBAUM, supra note 152, at 182–209. 
 155 ROBERT BROWNING’S POETRY 83–84 (James Loucks & Andrew Stauffer eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
In “Porphyria’s Lover,” a speaker describes the emotional power his lover has over him, and 
confesses to having murdered her so as to keep her close to him: 
[A]t last I knew/Porphyria worshipped me; surprise/Made my heart swell, and still it 
grew/While I debated what to do./That moment she was mine, mine, fair,/Perfectly 
pure and good: I found/A thing to do, and all her hair/In one long yellow string I 
wound/Three times her little throat around/And strangled her. No pain felt she;/I am 
quite sure she felt no pain. 
Id. The speaker then describes opening her eyes, holding her and kissing her, and staying up all 
night with her in his arms.  
 156 In “My Last Duchess,” the speaker, poised before a portrait of his late wife, describes 
having had her murdered, citing her happiness and gratitude towards the world as the reason. 
His words reveal that his psychopathic jealousy, not the stated (and implausible) cause, were 
responsible for the killing. “She had/A heart—how shall I say?—too soon made glad,/Too easily 
impressed; she liked whate’er/She looked on, and her looks went everywhere” (l. 21-24). “[A]ll 
and each/Would draw from her alike the approving speech,/Or blush, at least. She thanked 
men,—good! but thanked/Somehow—I know not how—as if she ranked/My gift of a nine-
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first-person voice, coupled with the judgment elicited by the horrific 
nature of the cruelty described, produces a deep irony in the poem.157 
This complexity is a function of the blurring between the character and 
the text, the voice of the Duke and, one suspects, Browning’s own 
restrained judging of him.158 
Likewise, first-person narration blurs the boundaries between 
character and text in ways that exacerbate the problem of entanglement 
for character law in copyright. In first-person narration, a gap opens 
often immediately, between the statements the speaker makes, and the 
extent to which a reader takes those statements at face value. In the 
excerpt from Catcher in the Rye, above, the reference to the “lousy 
childhood” raises a question for the first-time reader of the novel: was 
Holden’s childhood actually “lousy” (is the speaker sincere, and bitter) 
or was his childhood not in reality lousy (thus depriving him of the 
stated justification for his posture of bitterness, and ironizing the 
reference to David Copperfield, whose childhood genuinely was pretty 
lousy)? Authors derive narrative force from manipulating their 
narrators’ capacity to inspire belief as well as disbelief in readers, that is, 
from exploiting that continually arising gap between what the narrator 
purposely “tells” and what he inadvertently “shows.”159 
Through this narrative strategy, authors force readers to continue 
to renegotiate their relationships to characters, in turn complicating 
how copyright law can be expected to analyze characters’ autonomous 
existence. An author may use first-person narration to highlight that 
(speaking) character, or to highlight other characters through a one-
step-removed-from-center sort of consciousness.160 Alternatively, the 
first-person narrator may be a “ficelle” character, an expository device 
often found in the works of Henry James, sometimes used to structure 
the narrative by allowing proportionately arranged observations to 
dictate the story, rather than allowing the story to proceed based on the 
inner world of a character whose (perhaps disproportionately) 
emotional life might require a different (and aesthetically messy) 
structure.161 Mary Doyle Springer writes (quoting James) that the device 
spares readers “the heavy-handed narrator . . . [and] ‘the terrible fluidity 
of self-revelation’ in first-person narration” but the ficelle does not 
 
hundred-years-old name/With anybody’s gift. . . . /This grew; I gave commands;/Then all 
smiles stopped together. There she stands/As if alive” (l. 29-34). Id.  
 157 SINFIELD, supra note 153, at 6. 
 158 Id. (“‘My Last Duchess’ is continuously and radically ironic, for every line consists 
simultaneously of the Duke’s statements and Browning’s implications which we must work to 
realize in ourselves.”). 
 159 WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION 16 (1961). 
 160 SPRINGER, supra note 140, at 165. 
 161 Id. at 166. This was James’s reason for adopting the ficelle; he abhorred what he thought 
of as narrative “looseness” or undisciplined form. Id. at 1. 
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eliminate “possible confusion about just how central or ‘main’ [readers] 
are to take him to be.”162 Hence even literary criticism finds itself 
occasionally confounded by the existence of a character that uses first-
person narration, and unable to ascertain the character’s actual 
importance to the text (whether his centrality is actual or ironic, for 
instance). For copyright law to be able to determine which parts of the 
text ought to be associated with–treated as independent property that 
“belong” with—certain characters for the purposes of independent 
character protection in substantial similarity analysis, seems an 
improbably difficult task, destined to inspire bad case law. 
C.     Disentangling Character from Text and Style 
In its most sophisticated forms, then, the contemporary character 
is frequently difficult to separate from its text. Literature exposes the 
need for clear-eyed focus on the definitional boundaries of a character 
so long as copyright continues to give these boundaries such implicit 
force in making distributional determinations. How courts define 
characters plays a crucial role both in determining whether independent 
copyright protection subsists, and whether it has been violated. 
Literature also reveals the complexity in any attempt to define character. 
The difficulty need not mean the task is not worth undertaking, but 
literature helps show what is at stake if copyright ignores the 
entanglement problem, and it cuts in favor of finding an approach that 
does not require dependence on the outer boundaries of a character for 
fair adjudication. 
Copyright has implicitly struggled with characters’ entanglement 
with their texts in its attempts to define character, but it has yet to think 
through the consequences of this definitional difficulty. Often, a court’s 
attempts to reason its way to a solid definition of “character” fall flat. 
The definition may be tautological, unclear, or simply wrong, even at 
times in a thoughtful, otherwise well-reasoned opinion offered up by a 
court with plenty of experience adjudicating artistic property issues. For 
example, consider this judicial attempt to grapple with a definition of 
character, and a supporting rationale for that definition: “The characters 
from ‘Star Wars’ are elements in a drama; they have ‘character’ because 
they are part of a plot in which they interact with each other. Thus, they 
have attributes which are suggested by the movie itself.”163 The 
definition here is a moving target: first the characters are merely 
constitutive parts in a larger work; then they are thought to derive their 
 
 162 Id. at 166–67. 
 163 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 443 F. Supp. 291, 302 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
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“character” from their role in a plot, perhaps because of or through their 
interactions with other such characters; then it is their “attributes” 
which can be traced to the larger work. The thinking here is manifestly 
unclear. It highlights an important problem in character jurisprudence, 
namely, that it is not easy to distinguish between a character and her 
surrounding work, and that courts, even in copyright-savvy 
jurisdictions, struggle in their efforts to define a character’s scope vis-à-
vis the surrounding text. 
Leonard Zissu, a commentator on character law—and a leading 
attorney in character case law164—provides a helpful starting definition 
though he defines character very broadly: 
[A] character comprises some or all of such elements as (and 
principally) the name, physical appearance and attributes, 
mannerisms, speech and expressions, habits, attire, setting and locale. 
His association with the other designated characters and his outlook 
or view of life (subjective indicia) may also be regarded as within the 
composite which denotes the character.165 
Zissu’s inclusion of “setting” and “locale,” as well as a character’s 
“association” with other characters, attests to the breadth of scope 
imagined for characters under one view of copyright law. To the extent 
that Zissu’s character is so broad as defined, it practically does 
“constitute the story being told.” Only other characters, or narrative 
commentary, appear to be excluded. Still, those exclusions are an 
important one, which involve complex line-drawing. 
Copyright law has no accurate tools for such line-drawing, that is, 
for determining which parts of the character consist of protected 
expression that—in the property-rights logic that copyright seems to 
adopt in thinking of structuring and allocating entitlements—“belong” 
to one character rather than another, or to the separable character rather 
than the text. 
In many contemporary forms of narrative, it can be difficult indeed 
to distinguish between narrative commentary and the interior 
monologue of a given character. In fact, this is arguably the point of free 
indirect discourse. Literary scholars disagree over whether such 
narrative intertwining is hostile to characters166 or can be friendly to 
them,167 but under either view, what is clear is that a purposeful 
 
 164 Zissu served as Hammett’s attorney in the Sam Spade case and also litigated the Tarzan 
case before the Southern District in 1981. 
 165 Zissu, supra note 15, at 122. 
 166 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 72 (“Free indirect discourse holds the narrative voice 
somewhere in between the first and the third person. But it is not benign. Writers use it to slice 
the heads off their characters. . . . No character ever comes off well when free indirect discourse 
tries to lend a hand.”). 
 167 Daniel P. Gunn, Free Indirect Discourse and Narrative Authority in Emma, 12 
NARRATIVE 35, 35 (2004). 
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commingling of voices takes place.168 When information about 
characters can be gleaned, it may reach the reader through any number 
of different formal devices. Ought the law to consider this information 
as representing the character, or the text, for the purposes of character 
disentanglement analysis?169 Narrative’s technical complexity frustrates 
this aspect of copyright analysis. 
Note that literature does not purport to hold easy answers to 
character’s entanglement.170 Although in theory, a character’s functions 
might be separable from her dimensions, in practice, such distinctions 
are exceedingly difficult to draw for literary scholars, let alone for 
courts.171 For copyright, however, real-world consequences may attach 
when the definition of the character expands or contracts. For example, 
a character borrowed for unauthorized use in a subsequent work may be 
recognizable to readers, even if the surrounding subsequent work differs 
greatly from the preexisting work, such that substantial similarity 
analysis between the two works would fail. Courts would proceed to 
analyze substantial similarity between characters alone. But where they 
draw the line around the character will matter. Courts have protected 
characters’ names (when accompanied by at least some other 
characteristics); characters’ catchphrases; visual depictions of characters; 
and so on. What literary understandings of character show is the 
oversimplification of this view of characters’ easily discernible 
relationship to their texts. 
For the purposes of copyright, an additional problem lies in the 
extent to which aspects of character should more properly be 
characterized as artistic style, which by itself is not copyrightable. In 
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., at issue lay a promotional 
movie poster mimicking the work of Saul Steinberg, a New Yorker 
magazine cartoonist famed for his illustration depicting a New Yorker’s 
 
 168 Id. 
 169 SPRINGER, supra note 140, at 42 (“Modern fiction is a highly narrative art (though it is a 
highly delicate and necessary task to decide which parts are truly narrative and which 
inherently dramatic . . . . And we must not discount what we can learn about character through 
the rhetoric of diction, of narrative reports, descriptions, quotations, and lyric outbursts by a 
narrator or secondary characters, information often colored by a single strong point of view.”). 
 170 John Frow, Spectacle Binding: On Character, 7 POETICS TODAY 227, 227 (1986) (“The 
concept of character is perhaps the most problematic and the most undertheorized of the basic 
categories of narrative theory. It is also perhaps the most widely-used of all critical tools, at all 
levels of analysis; and its sheer obviousness disguises the conceptual difficulties it presents.”). 
 171 Phelan provides helpful framing for considering the form and role of characters 
throughout literature. 
A dimension is any aspect, feature, or quality a character may be said to possess when 
that character is considered in isolation from the work in which he or she appears. A 
function is any aspect, feature, or quality of a character that fulfills some purpose in 
connection with the other elements of the work. Every function depends upon a 
dimension but not every dimension will necessarily correspond to a function. 
Phelan, supra note 90, at 357. 
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parochial view of the world.172 Defendants allegedly copied the concept 
behind the poster and its execution, in promoting their upcoming film 
“Moscow on the Hudson.”173 Both works present a myopic view of the 
horizon, suggesting New York’s inflated sense of its importance to the 
world.174 Several elements could potentially have been elided, but the 
court’s careful attention to style, as against the idea of the posters, their 
actual subject matter, and finally their expression, was thoughtful and 
thorough.175 After describing the two works, the court recognized that 
“defendants cannot be held liable for using the idea of a map of the 
world from an egocentrically myopic perspective.”176 It turned to the 
modes of executing the idea used in both posters, focusing on the print; 
the “sketchy, whimsical style” of the renderings; the vantage point; the 
particular scene used to express New York’s self-satisfied viewpoint; the 
colors and their symbolic attributes (blue: sky; red: horizon); and the 
perspective on New York city traffic.177 The court concluded that 
plaintiff’s poster had depicted more than merely scènes à faire, and 
described the depiction of both the particular view of New York and the 
means of capturing it as far from inevitable.178 
Yet in grappling with what precisely it might be protecting, the 
court struggled to determine whether style was an integral part of the 
work, something that permeated it, or something extricable from it, a 
small quantum that could be evaluated apart from the work’s other 
elements. The court stated: “[T]his case involves the entire protected 
work and an iconographically, as well as proportionately, significant 
portion of the allegedly infringing work.”179 In thinking of the 
“iconographically significant” elements borrowed, the court comes 
dangerously close to protecting style. Steinberg seems to have been 
trying to stress that in fact not only style was appropriated here; 
defendants copied plaintiff’s style in addition to the subject matter he 
chose. Thus the case might have been a closer one.180 
Steinberg presents a helpful parallel for analyzing character 
protection. The court concluded that it could parse style from content 
and suggested that style is not, by itself, protectable. Literary evidence 
shows us that in many instances, characters may embody authorial style, 
making such parsing difficult. How characters are imagined in 
 
 172 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 173 Id. at 708. 
 174 Id. at 710. 
 175 Id. at 710–11. 
 176 Id. at 712. 
 177 Id. at 710, 712–13. 
 178 Id. at 712–13. 
 179 Id. at 713. 
 180 Without conceded access, a higher degree of similarity could have been required, for 
instance. Id. at 714. 
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relationship to their surrounding texts informs whether style will 
inadvertently be protected. If characters can be conceived of as 
comprising textual components that include stylistic features (such as 
point of view, narrative devices, manner of rendition), then downstream 
users who use the verbal equivalent of many “iconographically 
significant” elements of the work may find that they have impermissibly 
borrowed a character. This could be true even though the subsequent 
work is dissimilar from the preexisting work, and, absent characters, 
nothing but (theoretically uncopyrightable) style has been borrowed. 
Literature illustrates that this fine distinction presents a clear line-
drawing problem for the law. Returning to the example of The Catcher 
in the Rye, consider the following passage, which describes Holden’s 
late-night visit to his former teacher. Mr. Antolini gives Holden advice 
late at night, and as he listens, Holden gets sleepier and sleepier: 
I don’t know if you’ve ever done it, but it’s sort of hard to sit around 
waiting for somebody to say something when they’re thinking and 
all. It really is. I kept trying not to yawn. It wasn’t that I was bored or 
anything—I wasn’t—but I was so damn sleepy all of a 
sudden. . . . Then all of a sudden, I yawned. What a rude bastard, but 
I couldn’t help it! . . . I could’ve slept standing up I was so tired. . . . I 
got in bed with just my shorts on. It was way too short for me, the 
couch, but I really could’ve slept standing up without batting an 
eyelash. I laid awake for just a couple of seconds thinking about all 
the stuff Mr. Antolini’d told me. About finding out the size of your 
mind and all. He was really a pretty smart guy. But I couldn’t keep 
my goddam eyes open, and I fell asleep.181 
The passage evokes Holden in his iconic specificity. Yet trying to 
distinguish between the character-related aspects of the passage 
(potentially copyrightable) and the merely stylistic ones (theoretically 
not copyrightable) is difficult indeed. Many of the details that make 
Holden who he “is” are hard to distinguish from authorial choices 
attributable to “style.” For example, Holden addresses an unseen second 
person (“you”). He uses slang that dates him to the 1940s and displays 
noticeable verbal tics (including heavy use of the following words or 
phrases: “and all,” “it really is” “It wasn’t that” “damn,” and 
“goddam” [sic]). He uses hyperbole (“could’ve slept standing up)” and 
anaphora (by returning to the phrase in a different form: “could’ve slept 
standing up without batting an eyelash”). Lastly, he uses free indirect 
discourse, or thoughts reported by the narrative voice as though 
communicated directly from within the private consciousness of the 
character himself (“what a rude bastard!”) Consequently, what makes 
Holden unique is not the amalgam of visually evocative details that 
 
 181 SALINGER, supra note 148, at 246–49. 
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characterize certain kinds of very flat characters, or that bring to life 
superheroes and graphic or visual characters. 
Holden’s uniqueness lies in a combination of verbal and stylistic 
choices that are inextricable from the copyrightable expression 
associated with Holden as a character. Copyright seeks to protect and 
reward authors for their investments in characters’ development, 
without crossing over into protecting authorial style and thus limiting 
future authors in terms of adopting certain styles. Thus the character 
entanglement problem frustrates the law’s purposes. 
Indeed, how much of the work is protected under the ambit of “the 
character” as differentiated from uncopyrightable style is directly 
relevant to how copyright shapes the derivative work right. As such, 
character entanglement could play a potentially significant role in 
copyright reform with respect to literature and the scope of authors’ 
derivative work rights. If the law allows the scope of the character to 
expand to include whatever references subsequent authors make, then 
copyright law will proscribe more downstream expression even if there 
would or should be a gap between use of a protected character and use 
of unprotected stylistic elements from a work. Literature provides 
insights that help militate against that doctrinally unjustified expansion. 
III.     HOW COPYRIGHT ERRS IN DECIDING WHICH CHARACTERS TO 
PROTECT 
Literary theories and texts help to demonstrate that the law’s 
selection of characters for copyright protection is not neutral. Copyright 
law thus contravenes, at least in theory, its own aesthetic non-
discrimination principle.182 This Part shows that aesthetic decisions 
about what sorts of art are worth protecting filter into character 
copyright jurisprudence in three interrelated ways.183 First, copyright 
makes aesthetic determinations by protecting visual characters more 
readily than literary characters.184 Second, literature illustrates the 
 
 182 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 183 Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2001); Yen, infra note 227, at 298. 
 184 It ought to be noted that in fact the very dichotomy between literary and visual is 
problematic on numerous levels for literary scholars. Suffice it to say that erecting such a 
barrier presupposes that literary texts are not visual when in fact the volume and quality of 
scholarship on the history of the book, and the reinvigoration of the notion of the text as a 
material object, strongly suggest the distinction is a false one. See, e.g., A COMPANION TO THE 
HISTORY OF THE BOOK (Simon Eliot & Jonathan Rose eds., 2009); DAVID FINKELSTEIN & 
ALISTAIR MCCLEERY, THE BOOK HISTORY READER (2d ed. 2010); THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
THE BOOK IN BRITAIN (2009) (which spans six volumes and more than 1,300 years of 
bibliographic vicissitudes). Moreover, for scholars of manuscript even more than for scholars of 
print culture and its texts, interpreting a work is deeply intertwined with the text’s visual 
dimensions. See D.F. McKenzie, The Book as Expressive Form, in THE BOOK HISTORY READER, 
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problems flowing from copyright’s unclear terminology: by concluding 
that “word portraits” are not protectable, without a rigorous definition 
of “word portrait,” the law has reified a distinction between visual and 
literary media that ought never to have arisen.185 Third, copyright 
incorporates aesthetic valuation implicitly through the law’s “distinctive 
delineation” standard, which encourages and rewards the creation of a 
particular sort of character. Copyright law encourages and values flat 
characters over round ones, despite the way that doing so aesthetically 
privileges—at significant and unjustified expense—one set of literary 
and cultural conceptions of character over another. Perhaps most 
problematically of all, copyright law has not taken into consideration 
the theoretical and empirical evidence that readers do a great deal of 
work with characters when reading. In some fundamental sense, readers 
can be said to “complete” characters in their minds. This view has 
appeared in at least one important copyright case, and it represents a 
significant body of scholarship in literature. Yet if characters can be said 
to be incomplete, and to require completion by readers, it may be that 
they fail to satisfy the fundamental requirement of fixation. In ignoring 
the literary theories of a reader’s engagement with texts that point to 
characters’ lives beyond their texts, in readers’ minds, copyright law 
misses a chance to calibrate the scope of its protection as accurately as it 
could. 
A.     Copyright’s Preference for the Visual over the Verbal Character 
A distinction between visually and verbally rendered characters, 
whether justified or not, is now entrenched in copyright case law.186 An 
opinion by Judge Richard Posner affirmed the distinction between 
 
supra, at 39 (2006) (“The persistent example of fine printing and the revival of the calligraphic 
manuscript, and numerous recent studies of the sophisticated displays of text and illumination 
in medieval manuscript production also share a basic assumption that [visual] form affects 
sense.”). 
 185 The distinction between cartoon or visual characters and literary ones arises because the 
earliest (pre-Nichols) cases were brought by owners of copyrights in cartoon characters. Air 
Pirates then solidified the distinction, and Gaiman and other modern cases have affirmed it. 
See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that its 
own prior cases appearing to preclude copyright protection for literary characters did not apply 
to visually depicted characters, because “a comic book character, which has physical as well as 
conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique elements of expression”); Gaiman v. 
MacFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The description of a character in prose leaves 
much to the imagination, even when the description is detailed . . . Even after [reading The 
Maltese Falcon], one hardly knows what Sam Spade looked like. But everyone knows what 
Humphrey Bogart looked like.” Posner attributed that to “the difference between literary and 
graphic expression.”). 
 186 Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 754; Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The 
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). 
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literary and visual characters emphatically.187 The opinion is worth 
sustained attention, both because it represents a number of views that 
predominate in copyright, and because Judge Posner is an important 
figure in American jurisprudence, indeed, especially so in the areas of 
intellectual property and law and literature.188 The passage below sets up 
another important issue for copyright’s treatment of characters, which 
has to do with reader reception of characters and its implications for the 
fixation requirement, which the Article takes up more fully below. The 
opinion, quoted below, thus makes two interventions. The first is to cast 
the reader as passive when viewing images or television and active when 
reading texts, which, per Posner, require a higher level of semiotic 
participation. The second is to suggest that this difference in medium 
thus determines, in a sense, the copyrightability of the work in question: 
visual characters are more easily protected than verbal ones, which can 
too easily be deemed uncopyrightable “word portraits.” 
It is crucial first to understand the reader’s engagement with a 
character as playing a crucial role, in Posner’s view, in differentiating the 
visual and the textual.189 He justifies the distinction thus: 
The reason is the difference between literary and graphic expression. 
The description of a character in prose leaves much to the 
imagination, even when the description is detailed—as in Dashiell 
Hammett’s description of Sam Spade’s physical appearance in the 
first paragraph of The Maltese Falcon. “Samuel Spade’s jaw was long 
and bony, his chin a jutting v under the more flexible v of his mouth. 
His nostrils curved back to make another, smaller, v. His yellow-grey 
eyes were horizontal. The v motif was picked up again by thickish 
brows rising outward from twin creases above a hooked nose, and his 
pale brown hair grew down—from high flat temples—in a point on 
his forehead. He looked rather pleasantly like a blond satan.” Even 
after all this, one hardly knows what Sam Spade looked like. But 
everyone knows what Humphrey Bogart looked like. A reader of 
 
 187 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (distinguishing the Sam Spade case, even if it were good law, on 
account of the “difference between literary and graphic expression”). 
 188 Kate O’Neill, Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach Posner, 39 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 507, 507–08 (2009) (surveying and building on the literature on why Posner’s 
opinions are widely taught in the academy). On the substantiality of Posner’s substantive 
contributions to these two legal areas, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE: A 
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); see also Teresa Huang, Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right 
Step in Determining Joint Authorship for Copyrighted Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 673, 
693–700 (2005). 
 189 It is in many respects a false dichotomy, to oppose the visual and the textual. Many 
textual critics pay a great deal of attention to the visually discernible aspects of a text, such as 
lineation, font, pagination, binding, paper choice and quality, and so on. Zahr Kassim Said, 
Only Part of the Picture: A Response to Professor Tushnet’s Worth a Thousand Words, 16 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 349, 354 (2013). 
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unillustrated fiction completes the work in his mind; the reader of a 
comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive.190 
Posner’s reasoning embeds outdated assumptions about the way readers 
process images and engage with imaginative content.191 Still, Posner’s 
view does map onto one set of views governing literary interpretation, 
known variously as reception studies, reader response theory, or the 
implied reader theory, which holds that readers create or actualize the 
meanings in the texts they consume.192 Posner’s theory of active readerly 
engagement with character is thus not necessarily at odds with literary 
theory.193 However, Posner then suggests that readers of comic books 
and viewers of film and television are not engaged in the way readers 
are. This notion runs very much counter to contemporary media studies 
and literary theories of interpretation and consumption.194 Posner’s 
view purports to explain a way in which literary characters are different 
from visual characters. Yet reader response theorists would argue that 
cartoon characters and other visually rendered images also require 
construction and decoding by readers to deliver meanings.195 In other 
words, such theories of reception are medium-neutral. 
Posner’s take on the visual/verbal distinction may also be framed in 
terms of the ease with which courts can recognize infringement of visual 
characters, in contrast with the difficulties attendant on substantial 
similarity analysis for literary characters.196 Other courts also reflect the 
attitude expressed in Posner, that images clearly reveal infringement, 
and words do not.197 The logic implies that visual images create a kind 
of short cut, from “mind to mind”; they are treated, according to one 
influential view, as though they are transparent.198 If copyright premises 
 
 190 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61. 
 191 JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 62, 65–66 (1987). 
 192 Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the 
Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 736–37 (1993). 
 193 Margolin, supra note 118, at 1 (“[R]eaders as readers (not as poeticians [sic]) do create 
characters from texts); see also WOLFGANG ISER, THE IMPLIED READER: PATTERNS OF 
COMMUNICATION IN PROSE FICTION FROM BUNYAN TO BECKETT (1974) (re-characterizing the 
reader as an engaged entity who must work actively to produce the text’s meanings); HANS 
ROBERT JAUSS, TOWARD AN AESTHETIC OF RECEPTION (Timothy Bahti trans., 1982). 
 194 For one among many such accounts of the engaged consumer of audiovisual content, see, 
e.g., FISKE, supra note 191, at 62–83 (“The audiences participate in the meanings of the 
program,” and “Meanings are determined socially: that is, they are constructed out of the 
conjuncture of the text with the socially situated reader.”). 
 195 Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 124 
(2010) (“As Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, and Hans Robert Jauss have variously 
argued, . . . texts—such as films and television programs—[must be understood] in terms of 
their own interpretation, construction, and reception [by readers (or viewers)] through an 
active process of decoding and encoding.”). 
 196 Helfand, supra note 10, at 631. 
 197 Tushnet, supra note 186, at 719. 
 198 Id. at 686–87. Tushnet persuasively argues that courts tend to treat images in polarized 
fashion:  
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its protection on what are effectively mental shortcuts, however, surely it 
begins trespassing on the territory of trademark, which is the proper 
legal regime for protecting symbols that signify source and create 
shortcuts for consumers interested in the symbol’s related goods and 
services.199 
Literary theories undercut the various rationales expressed or 
implied in Gaiman for distinguishing between visual and verbal 
characters, and legal principles under both copyright and trademark 
suggest that the distinction does not justify itself doctrinally either. 
B.     Literary “Word Portraits” and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
Literature suggests that the distinction between unprotectable 
“word portraits” and protectable portraits composed of images, if 
resting on nothing more, is untenable. Moreover, the distinction courts 
have drawn between literary and visual representation obscures the 
important work that can and must be done by the idea/expression 
dichotomy.200 At present, visual characters are deemed more readily 
copyrightable than literary ones.201 Consequently, what copyright law 
terms “word portraits” of characters are not—at least in theory202—
copyrightable.203 The law is non-neutral because it more readily accords 
protection for visual characters than for verbal ones, as is made clear in 
the withholding of protection for “word portraits.” In fact, the proper 
standard for copyrightability should not be the medium of rendition, 
but the results of the rendition, filtered through the idea/expression 
dichotomy.204 
At present, copyright law holds that what it refers to as “word 
portraits” are uncopyrightable. Yet copyright law should distinguish 
 
Copyright oscillates between two positions on nontextual creative works such as 
images: they are either transparent, or they are opaque. When courts treat images as 
transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary, claiming that images merely 
replicate reality, so that the meaning of an image is so obvious that it admits of no 
serious debate. When they treat images as opaque, they deny that interpretation is 
possible, because images are so far from being susceptible to discussion and analysis 
using words that there is no point in trying. 
 Id. 
 199 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 474. 
 200 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 201 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2004); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air 
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 202 Cf. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting District Court Hearing 
(June 17, 2009) (Hr’g Tr. 24)) (describing J.D. Salinger’s Holden Caulfield as “quite delineated 
by word,” “a portrait by words” and then going on to protect him as an independent character). 
 203 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12. 
 204 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Mannion v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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between the “word portrait” as a generic form, and contemporary 
renderings, in words, of characters, through expression that may well be 
protectable even if it is verbally, rather than visually, rendered. 
Copyright does not explicitly define “word portrait,” but the phrase 
“word portraits,” appears in case law to be synonymous with 
unprotected “ideas” rather than protected “expression.”205 This parallel 
seems mistaken, from the literary perspective, because it collapses idea 
into expression. Furthermore, it incorporates an unclear, non-standard 
understanding of the meaning of “word portrait.” 
Literature possesses at least one form recognized to consist of a 
portrait in words. Known as a “blazon” and associated with a flourishing 
of late Renaissance poetry, it is a genre commonly composed of stock 
images and conventional modes of describing physical features, albeit in 
highly idealized, symbolic form.206 An example of a blazon likely to be 
familiar to readers is Shakespeare’s Sonnet No. 130.207 Rather, it is more 
accurate to say that it is an anti-blazon or a blazon subverting its generic 
conventions. It begins: “My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the 
sun;/Coral is far more red than her lips’ red./If snow be white, why then 
her breasts are dun[.]”208 Translated into legal terms, the blazon as a 
generic form is uncopyrightable, under the scènes à faire doctrine.209 In 
this sense, it aligns with copyright’s vision of a “word portrait.” The 
blazon is an artistic form whose rules make the prescribed elements 
“indispensable” for all who would grapple with it.210 On the one hand, 
Shakespeare’s anti-blazon as a genre would similarly be 
uncopyrightable: making fun of the form must be available as an option 
for future authors, and “the anti-blazon” had, in any event, existed for 
centuries before Shakespeare composed this one.211 On the other hand, 
the expressive details used in executing the idea of the anti-blazon, such 
as comparing a lover’s bosom to the dull, dingy color of donkey hair, 
might well constitute protected expression.212 
 
 205 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12. 
 206 See, e.g., Grant Williams, Disarticulating Fantasies: Figures of Speech, Vices, and the 
Blazon in Renaissance English Rhetoric, 29 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 43, 46 (1999) (“[T]he blazon is 
exclusively a figurative phenomenon: it is not only epitomized by a single figure . . . but also 
comprised of any number of individual figures, both tropes and schemes; for instance, 
metaphors, similes, synecdoches, anaphoras, isocolons, divisios, [sic] and hyperboles, to name 
but a few.”). 
 207 JONATHAN BATE, THE GENIUS OF SHAKESPEARE 52 (1998) (describing the blazon as a 
genre in which the lover “enumerate[s] the beauties of their beloved from top to toe”). 
 208 THE NORTON SHAKESPEARE (Stephen Greenblatt et al. eds., 1997). 
 209 Kurtz, supra note 57, at 108, 114. 
 210 Id. at 91. 
 211 BATE, supra note 207, at 52. 
 212 Dun Definition, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/dun (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (defining “dun,” an adjective, as “of a dull 
grayish-brown color”). 
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Literature highlights the limits of copyright’s understanding of the 
“word portrait.” Compare, for example, the operation of an 
(uncopyrightable) blazon (as a generic vehicle for praising the idealized 
form of the beloved through a collage of conventional metaphors and 
images) to a contemporary description of a character from a bestselling 
novel, Stieg Larsson’s The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.213 
[She] was a pale, anorexic young woman who had hair as short as a 
fuse, and a pierced nose and eyebrows. She had a wasp tattoo about 
an inch long on her neck, a tattooed loop around the biceps of her 
left arm and another around her left ankle. On those occasions when 
she had been wearing a tank top, Armansky also saw that she had a 
dragon tattoo on her left shoulder blade. She was a natural redhead, 
but she dyed her hair raven black. She looked as though she had just 
emerged from a week-long orgy with a gang of hard rockers. . . . She 
had simply been born thin, with slender bones that made her look 
girlish and fine-limbed with small hands, narrow wrists, and childlike 
breasts. She was twenty-four, but she sometimes looked fourteen. She 
had a wide mouth, a small nose, and high cheekbones that gave her 
an almost Asian look. Her movements were quick and spidery, and 
when she was working at the computer her fingers flew over the 
keys. . . . Sometimes she wore black lipstick, and in spite of the 
tattoos and the pierced nose and eyebrows she 
was . . . well . . . attractive.214 
It would be difficult to claim that the portrayal above is not 
“distinctively delineated” under a range of possible meanings for that 
phrase. Notice, however, that proclaiming Lisbeth distinctively 
delineated as a character does little to distinguish idea from expression 
as copyright law requires; it merely presumes the existence of a dividing 
line, somewhere. Concededly, the line-drawing required by the 
dichotomy presents significant difficulty, as others have noted. 
Nonetheless, no test or tool has superseded it yet.215 The character 
described above can be framed as a broad idea (young sexy female punk 
who has a job) which would provide a broader scope of protection 
against subsequent uses,216 or as a narrowly drawn idea (counter-
cultural young female detective/hacker with puckish sexuality who 
defies professional and societal expectations), which would provide 
narrower future protection for the work since many of its expressive 
elements could arguably fall around the very specifically tailored “idea” 
at the heart of the work. The passage above clearly possesses some 
 
 213 STIEG LARSSON, THE GIRL WITH THE DRAGON TATTOO (Reg Keeland trans., 2008). 
 214 Id. at 32. 
 215 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  
 216 The broader the idea animating a given work, the more of the work can conceivably be 
deemed copyrightable expression. In turn, proportionately less of the work will be 
presumptively available for downstream users. 
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protected expression, even if the scope of that protection is subject to 
debate; determining how much protection is part of the difficult but 
constitutionally required work for judges adjudicating copyright 
decisions.217 Unlike the blazon, it grounds its figure not, for the most 
part,218 in figurative language and symbols (such as the sun and coral)219 
but in concrete markers (such as specific tattoos, hair color, bone 
structure, and numerous other precisely tailored details). It might be 
called a very “visual” description for a literary character. 
Copyright law should dispense with the unclear terminology of the 
“word portrait” and instead focus attention on the idea/expression 
dichotomy. Literary descriptions of character, mistakenly termed “word 
portraits,” should be considered through copyright’s idea/expression 
analysis, just as any other rendering of an artistic character is. Indeed, 
the Copyright Act requires this sort of filtering as between protected and 
unprotected elements of expressive works.220 
In light of literary traditions and theories, the law’s distinction 
between visual and literary characters should not be maintained. 
Whether the rationale is ease of evidentiary process (and the imagined 
transparency of images)221 or aesthetic preference (for graphically 
rendered or visually evocative characters), the result is the same. If the 
incentives theory of copyright protection is accurate—and scholarship 
and law both behave as though it is—the law incentivizes the creation of 
characters that, though rendered in words, consist of descriptions that 
are as graphic or as visually evocative as possible.222 In other words, 
authors who create literary renderings of character that leave very little 
to the imagination would, under the Posner rationale stated above, 
merit stronger protection of their characters, because these figures 
would be more like visually rendered characters than like “word 
portraits.” Copyright scholarship has yet to take stock of what this may 
 
 217 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Alfred C. Yen, 
A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s 
“Total Concept and Feel”, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 400 (1989). 
 218 The passage contains some figurative language, including: the similes “hair short as a 
fuse,” and the phrase “[s]he looked as though she had just emerged from a week-long orgy,” 
and the metaphor of “spidery” movement. Nonetheless, the dominant mode of discourse here 
is not figurative but quite concretely grounded. LARSON, supra note 213, at 32. 
 219 See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing Shakespeare’s Sonnet No. 130, 
which embeds figurative language drawing on images of the sun and coral). 
 220 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 221 Tushnet, supra note 186, at 686–87. 
 222 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (dismissing 
the argument that copyright necessarily restricts First Amendment freedoms, because copyright 
is itself responsible for incentivizing the creation of a considerable amount of speech); see also 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
483, 606–27 (1996); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What 
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).  
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imply for literary production. The next Part argues that these incentives 
translate into privileging one aesthetic mode over another and could 
lead to the creation of flat, rather than round, characters. 
C.     Characters in Search of a Neutral Copyrightability Standard 
The distinctive delineation standard set out in Nichols skews 
protection towards a particular kind of artistic production that, in 
theoretical terms, could be said to privilege the visual, and the flat, over 
the verbal, and the round.223 Indeed, the very phrase “distinctive 
delineation,” first introduced in Nichols, contains within it hints of 
copyright’s valorization of the visual over the literary discussed in the 
previous Part: the idea of delineation comes not from verbal creation 
but from the realm of drawing or painting, and means to create by 
drawing lines.224 Yet the distinctive delineation test moves beyond mere 
preference for the visual. It encourages and rewards literature that 
features characters that are easy to recognize as “distinctive,” and thus 
much likelier to be flat characters rather than round. To understand the 
aesthetic implications of the distinctive delineation test, it is important 
first to grasp the role it plays in copyright opinions. 
Copyright infringement analysis generally features two stages 
(assuming plaintiffs have proven ownership of a valid copyright). 
Plaintiffs must first show copying.225 Plaintiffs must then prove that the 
copying was impermissible, that is, that defendants not only copied, but 
copied material that was protectable.226 Copyright infringement analysis 
with respect to independent characters proceeds along two further 
 
 223 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 224 Deliniation Definition, ACADEMIC DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS, 
http://useful_english.enacademic.com/35244/delineation (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (The first 
definition for “delineation” provides: “The action of tracing out something by lines; the 
drawing of a diagram, geometrical figure, etc.; . . . a drawing, diagram, or figure.” The second 
and third definitions establish even more strongly the visual nature of delineation’s mode of 
representation. They state, respectively: “The action of tracing in outline something to be 
constructed; a sketch, outline, plan, rough draft. Usually fig.” and “The action or manner of 
representing an object by a drawing or design; pictorial representation, portraiture; . . . a 
portrait, likeness, picture.”). 
 225 Proof of copying may be provided through direct evidence, or through the presumption 
of copying which arises if plaintiffs can prove (1) that defendants had access to the copied work 
and took advantage of that access, and (2) that the works in question are “substantially similar.” 
Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169–70 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The issue of 
copying can be broken down into two subissues. The first is whether the alleged copier had 
access to the work that he is claimed to have copied; the second is whether, if so, he used his 
access to copy.”). 
 226 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (“The real task in a copyright infringement action . . . is to determine whether there 
has been copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea itself.”). 
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tiers.227 First, the court inquires whether the character was 
copyrightable.228 Under the Nichols test, once characters are deemed 
sufficiently expressive to be “distinctively delineated,” they may be 
copyrightable apart from the works that surround them.229 Second, the 
court asks whether the defendant copied the protected aspects of the 
character’s expression, or “merely a broader and more abstract 
outline.”230 
One way of viewing the threshold inquiry into character 
copyrightability is as an example of the idea/expression dichotomy in 
action.231 A second way of seeing this test is as a regrettable diversion 
from the matter at hand: the focus on the character’s copyrightability 
and “distinctiveness” shifts attention away from the copying analysis, 
where attention properly belongs.232 A third way of seeing it is as the 
law’s imposition of an aesthetic requirement to qualify for copyright 
protection.233 The first and second views seem right, but they are 
insufficient.234 The third view arguably reveals the problem behind the 
“distinctively delineated” standard: it masks evaluative work that 
necessarily takes place in the course of its determination. In other 
words, the test offers a legal conclusion posing as a standard, and 
incorporates aesthetic preferences without doing so explicitly. 
The distinctive delineation test is an unclear and subjective one 
that leads to conclusory legal analysis. Perhaps because courts do not 
know how to implement a standard like this, characters are often simply 
 
 227 This analysis operates apart from the prior analysis of whether the work as a whole was 
(a) copied and (b) copied impermissibly. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic 
Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (describing substantial similarity analysis at the first stage 
of proving copying). 
 228 Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (1988). 
 229 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). No court has relied 
solely on Sam Spade’s “constitutes the story being told” test. 
 230 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12. 
 231 See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51 (“As Malvolio’s analogue (with a different name) was 
moved through different surroundings and episodes, the pattern common to both characters 
would tend to describe only a stock figure, ‘idea’ not ‘expression . . . .’”); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(reasoning that under Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121, “copyright protection is granted to a character if 
it is developed with enough specificity so as to constitute protectable expression”). 
 232 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.12; Kurtz, supra note 11, at 927. 
 233 Helfand, supra note 10, at 631 (“Determining whether a character is ‘sufficiently 
delineated’ to be eligible for copyright protection involves, in effect, assessing the character’s 
‘inherent worth.’”). 
 234 If character copyrightability were merely about the idea/expression dichotomy, it would 
be unnecessary. Thus something else is needed to account for its tenacity in the case law. Kurtz 
and Nimmer may be right in commenting that character copyrightability is a diversion, but so 
long as courts continue to engage in it, its implications bear considering. 
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declared to be highly delineated with little argument or evidentiary 
support, along these lines:235 
Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with his 
jungle environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to 
experience human emotions. He is athletic, innocent, youthful, 
gentle and strong. He is Tarzan.236 
The description hardly amounts to a carefully reasoned legal finding,237 
though the court did conclude that Tarzan was copyrightable.238 
Again and again, the distinctive delineation test produces 
inconsistent, aesthetically non-neutral results.239 The alternative, the 
constitutes-the-story-being-told test has little power as a meaningful 
alternative, despite never having been overruled.240 Thus the distinctive 
delineation test ends up playing an important role in determinations of 
 
 235  
The Rocky characters are one of the most highly delineated group [sic] of characters 
in modern American cinema. The physical and emotional characteristics of Rocky 
Balboa and the other characters were set forth in tremendous detail in the three 
Rocky movies before Anderson appropriated the characters for his treatment. The 
interrelationships and development of Rocky, Adrian, Apollo Creed, Clubber Lang, 
and Paulie are central to all three movies. Rocky Balboa is such a highly delineated 
character that his name is the title of all four of the Rocky movies and his character 
has become identified with specific character traits ranging from his speaking 
mannerisms to his physical characteristics. This Court has no difficulty ruling as a 
matter of law that the Rocky characters are delineated so extensively that they are 
protected from bodily appropriation when taken as a group and transposed into a 
sequel by another author. Plaintiff has not and cannot put before this Court any 
evidence to rebut the defendants’ showing that Rocky characters are so highly 
delineated that they warrant copyright protection. 
Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
Note that the court points only to producers’ decision to title the films after the character, and 
to his “specific character traits” such as “speaking mannerisms [to his] physical characteristics.” 
Id. At this level of generality, the court’s statements seem far more conclusory than carefully 
reasoned. Even if they could have pointed to details to prove the matter asserted—Rocky’s 
“highly delineated” status—the Anderson court did not feel the need to do so. 
 236 Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 683 
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 237 Kurtz, supra note 11, at 458. Kurtz elaborated, 
Nothing in this description indicates why Tarzan was distinctively delineated. The 
description is of little more than a type. Surely another author could write a non-
infringing story about an individual in tune with a jungle environment and able to 
communicate with animals, who is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle, and strong. 
Indeed, the description seems to fit Kipling’s Mowgli as well as Tarzan. The court’s 
difficulty in explaining why Tarzan was distinctively delineated illustrates the 
problem inherent in attempting to make such a determination without comparing 
the characters in the allegedly infringed and infringing works. 
Id. 
 238 Burroughs, 519 F. Supp. at 391 (“It is beyond cavil that the character ‘Tarzan’ is 
delineated in a sufficiently distinctive fashion to be copyrightable.”). 
 239 See, e.g., Brylawski, supra note 15, at 77; Kurtz, supra note 11, at 456. 
 240 Id. 
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the fact and scope of independent copyright protection. In case after 
case pertaining to copyright in characters, aesthetic determinations 
necessarily take place on or below the surface, despite the well-settled 
principle that courts should not assess aesthetic value in the course of 
copyright adjudication.241 These aesthetic valuations are sometimes 
outcome-determinative. Theoretically, copyright law is premised on the 
notion that aesthetic neutrality is necessary, possible, and good.242 Yet 
the reality does not play out that way, as scholarship has noted, in an 
effort to begin to evaluate the theoretical consequences of non-
neutrality for artistic production.243 
The problem of inartful application of the distinctive delineation 
test arose again in recent litigation.244 J.D. Salinger (and his estate, after 
he died during litigation) brought suit over an unauthorized sequel to 
Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye, called Sixty Years Later: Coming 
Through the Rye, by “J.D. California” (the pseudonym of Swedish-
American author Fredrik Colting). The sequel starred a fictionalized 
version of Salinger himself and an aged version of Salinger’s Holden 
Caulfield, the protagonist from The Catcher in the Rye and arguably one 
of the most iconic literary figures of the twentieth century.245 The lower 
court found the subsequent work infringing of its source work, and 
issued a preliminary injunction barring the sequel from distribution in 
the United States.246 In finding Caulfield protectable, the lower court 
jumbled the copyright doctrine: 
Holden Caulfield is quite delineated by word. It is a portrait by 
words.247 It is something that is obviously seen to be of value since 
the effort is made [by defendants] to recall everything that the 
character in the book does . . . It is difficult, in fact, to separate 
Holden Caulfield from the book.248 
The court in Salinger I found Holden “quite delineated,” suggesting 
itself to be on the way to a finding of copyrightability under its 
articulation of the Nichols test, though without reasoning its way 
 
 241 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 242 Id. at 251; cf. Yen, supra note 227, at 248. 
 243 See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression 
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L. REV. 175, 231–32 (1990); 
Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1232 (1997); Yen, 
supra note 227, at 248. 
 244 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 245 Menand, infra note 256. 
 246 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73. The Second Circuit reversed on procedural grounds, but noted 
with approval the Southern District’s copyright analysis. 
 247 Id. An additional point of confusion that undermines confidence in the court’s 
reasoning: it identified Holden as a “portrait by words,” which sounds like the “word portrait” 
that under copyright has historically not been protectable. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2-12. 
 248 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73 (quoting District Court Hearing (June 17, 2009) (Hr’g Tr. 24)). 
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through to its conclusion.249 The court then implied that Holden’s value 
derives from Colting’s decision to appropriate Holden. That is, the 
choice to copy, and the number of Holden’s actions copied, served as 
the measure of whether Holden was sufficiently distinctively delineated 
for protection. Clearly, this circular reasoning does not provide a proper 
measure of a character’s protectability.250 That the court should conclude 
delineation based on a character’s market value or artistic interest to 
downstream authors, rather than reasoning its way towards a sound 
analysis of copyrightability, may suggest the difficulty of the 
copyrightability determination for independent characters. Based on 
this and other similarly conclusory case law, then, it would be difficult to 
develop a formula for arriving at distinctive delineation, which, in turn, 
poses a problem for those who wish to use preexisting characters in new 
works. 
By and large, copyright law and scholarship assume that incentives 
matter to authors, and following thereon, will take copyright law into 
account when making artistic decisions. Because the law is presupposed 
to create meaningful incentives for creators, we can assume, at least 
arguendo, that creators may create so as to optimize their copyright 
protection. If this is so, the distinctive delineation test will skew 
characters in the direction of distinctiveness that is easily perceived, 
which the case law suggests is truer of visual than verbal characters.251 
Lisbeth Salander, the tattooed cyber-sleuth mentioned above, 
might be an overdetermined example of the way contemporary 
literature offers up very visually detailed characters.252 Yet it sets up a 
 
 249 Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 250 Litman, supra note 17, at 429 (stating that merely because something is copied does not 
make it valuable). Otherwise, as a matter of logic, copyright would collapse the idea/expression 
analysis: merely because something had been taken, it would make it protectable. Thus 
anything borrowed would be de facto infringing, as a default. Clearly, copyright law could not 
be correctly construed to reach that result.  
 251 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 252 Another, perhaps more convincing parallel exists in the transition from the “vermin” 
Gregor Samsa becomes in Franz Kafka’s story (vermin being, apparently, the most authoritative 
English translation of Kafka’s original “ungeziefer”) to Gregor Samsa’s appearance in a later 
adaptation of the story, Marc Estrin’s Insect Dreams. Per Kafka:  
When Gregor Samsa woke up one morning from unsettling dreams, he found 
himself changed in his bed into a monstrous vermin. He was lying on his back as 
hard as armor plate, and when he lifted his head a little, he saw his vaulted brown 
belly, sectioned by arch-shaped ribs, to whose dome the cover, about to slide off 
completely, could barely cling. His many legs, pitifully thin compared with the size of 
the rest of him, were waving helplessly before his eyes. 
FRANZ KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS 3 (Stanley Corngold trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1996) 
(footnotes omitted). Estrin’s vermin: 
He was five feet, six inches from the top of his head to the tip of his tegmina, not 
counting his cerci, which, because of the need to wear clothing, were most often 
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helpful parallel nonetheless. Consider her in juxtaposition with 
Salinger’s Holden Caulfield. By contrast with Lisbeth Salander, Holden 
Caulfield is much more difficult to fix in the mind’s eye253 in the way 
Posner imagines readers doing with cartoon characters in Gaiman.254 
Holden is not a character easily recognizable in a paragraph’s visually 
descriptive language. Very few physical details characterize Salinger’s 
depiction of him. Readers learn of a red hunting hat to which Holden 
grows attached, and which he keeps folded in his pocket, but very little 
else makes Holden visually distinctive.255 He could have been played, in 
a film version, by James Dean, or James Franco, or James Spader, 
without a reader’s protesting, on the basis of textual evidence, that the 
film had failed to cast Holden faithfully. 
Holden Caulfield is round. He is an extraordinarily memorable 
character,256 but what makes him unique arguably has less to do with the 
amount of imagination needed to conjure him, or the number of 
concrete details associated with his looks, and more to do with the 
iconoclastic tenor of his moods, his laconic dialogue, and his sardonic 
 
strapped to his abdomen underneath. . . . His most striking features—the most 
upsetting, at least to strangers—were his eyes, two huge compound eyes, seven inches 
across, of two thousand lenses each. In the faintest light they would glisten, 
iridescent, ever-changing. Vision for those with compound eyes is both less—and 
more—exact than for those of us with mammalian organs. While the overall image 
was somewhat blurry, a mosaic of soft focus like the surface of a Seurat, his 
perception of motion was vastly more acute. . . . so his peripheral vision was 
immense. . . . His mouth was far more adept than our own, with hard, chitinous jaws 
for chewing from side to side, maxillae with both soft and stiff bristles for 
grooming . . . His ears, so to speak, were subgenual organs located in each knee 
joint . . . . 
MARC ESTRIN, INSECT DREAMS: THE HALF-LIFE OF GREGOR SAMSA 11–12 (2002). The emphasis 
on greater visual perception and the translation of his experience into visual terms through 
reference to a Seurat painting may suggest a number of reasons for which characters may be 
more visually rendered now (in Estrin) than then (in Kafka). This has nothing or little to do 
with copyright law, and more to do with modernity, shifts in readers’ taste and artistic 
techniques, a greater interest in phenomenological narrative, etc. But it does not disprove the 
argument that characters may often find expression in more visually vivid and detailed ways 
than they once did, and that copyright consequences may flow from that increased attention to 
the visual. 
 253 Cf. Jennifer Paull, J.D. Salinger Style—Tipping Our Hats to Holden Caulfield, STYLELIST 
(Jan. 19, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://www.stylelist.com/2010/01/29/j-d-salinger-style-tipping-our-
hats-to-holden-caulfield (“Caulfield, the narrator of Salinger’s novel “The Catcher in the Rye” is 
such a vivid character that you can practically hear, smell and touch him.”). 
 254 Cf. Posner’s discussion of the reader’s engagement with literary versus visual characters, 
in Gaiman, discussed supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 255 SALINGER, supra note 148, at 17 (“It was this red hunting hat, with one of those very, very 
long peals. I saw it in the window of this sports store when we got out of the subway, just after I 
noticed I’d lost all the goddam foils. It only cost me a buck. The way I wore it, I swung the old 
peak way around to the back—very corny, I’ll admit but I liked it that way, I looked good in it 
that way.”). 
 256 Louis Menand, Holden at Fifty: “The Catcher in the Rye” and What It Spawned, THE NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 82. 
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interior monologue.257 In particular, his sensitivity to artifice and 
“phoniness” of almost any kind marks him as very particularized.258 
These, however, are not elements easily separated from the text itself, as 
shown in the discussion above, at pages 31-32. To the extent that they 
can be grouped into categories, it is not clear why Holden’s traits make 
him something other than an unprotectable word portrait. Holden’s 
conceptual characteristics make him “round” in ways that have attracted 
hundreds of articles, scores of books, and millions of readers.259 Yet 
these qualities are harder to muster in concise textual evidence and 
harder to separate from the text for the purposes of infringement 
analysis. Perhaps for these reasons, the court made a point of citing to 
articles on how culturally important Holden had become, almost as if 
preempting critiques of its cursory copyrightability analysis.260 In light 
of its own copyright standards, the law should not have found it so easy 
to protect Holden independently of The Catcher in the Rye.261 
Copyright’s standards of independent character protection make it 
easier to protect flat than round characters. 
The implications of copyright’s valorization of flat characters are 
especially troubling in light of the incentives theory of copyright. The 
visual nature of Stieg Larsson’s description of the eponymous “girl with 
the dragon tattoo” in words could be attributable to a number of factors, 
aesthetic, cultural, legal, or otherwise. For instance, Larsson may have 
anticipated the film’s development into a film; much popular literature 
styles itself as though screenplay-ready.262 Indeed, the novel feels filmic 
in many respects, not just in its descriptions of character.263 He may 
 
 257 Posner may have been correct in asserting that some literary characters leave more to the 
imagination than others, but the juxtaposition of Holden and Lisbeth calls into question 
whether it is right to accord greater protection on the basis of this difference. 
 258 Duane Edwards, Holden Caulfield Suffers from Unresolved Sexual Conflict, in 
DEPRESSION IN J.D. SALINGER’S THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 89 (Dedria Bryfonski ed., 2009) 
(“What does make him extraordinary is his special ability to detect phoniness everywhere 
(except in himself).”). 
 259 Menand, supra note 256. 
 260 Indeed, one might say that the court adjudicated the matter as though Holden were, by 
analogy, a trademark, a thing whose fame did actually matter in determining the way the law 
should proceed. 
 261 Recall that, absent independent copyright protection, Holden would be protectable 
insofar as he is synonymous with the text: subsequent authors’ uses would be measured against 
whether the text (not Holden as a character) had been impermissibly copied. 
 262 Zahr K. Said, Novels for Hire (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 263 I have in mind the way the narrative feels cinematic in its cuts between scenes, and in its 
attention to details of framing scenes visually, as though imagining them as tableaux or 
storyboards. There are also numerous brands mentioned with regularity, which I have argued 
elsewhere is often a signal to sponsors and audiovisual producers of a literary work’s 
adaptability for the screen. Id. at 36 (“Placing brands in literature need not be motivated by 
formal sponsorship agreements because such authors may embed brands so as to make it easy 
to convert their literary works into viable screenplays or tv scripts for which it then becomes 
easy to secure sponsors’ involvement. Sponsors can see their name in literary lights and 
determine ahead of time whether they will like the role created for their brand.”). 
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have used such expressive and detailed language to emphasize Lisbeth 
Salander’s difference from earlier literary detectives and signal his 
subversion of the generic conventions of detective fiction. Or he might 
have done so to maximize the amount of independent copyright 
protection she would receive as a character, against subsequent uses. 
While this last explanation is, intuitively, the most farfetched, it aligns 
with copyright scholarship’s treatment of authors as economic actors. 
Indeed: copyright’s dominant discourse today is arguably utilitarian, 
and it relies on the incentives theory as a justification.264 If scholars 
continue to take the incentives theory of copyright seriously, they must 
consider that this is one possible outcome of the distinctive delineation 
test: the characters that will be created will display “physical” rather than 
“conceptual” qualities, and will be characters that can be most easily 
imagined in concrete terms.265 Creating flat characters is arguably much 
easier than creating round ones.266 Had Salinger conceived of Holden so 
as to maximize his copyright protection in him, he might well have 
ended up much less intricate and emotionally compelling to the 
generations who have followed. He might have ended up more 
caricature than character. 
Literature draws attention to the fact and impact of copyright’s 
protection of characters that are flat rather than round.267 Though the 
court found Holden, a round character, copyrightable, it did violence to 
copyright analysis in so finding. The distinctively delineated standard 
skews protection for characters who exhibit characteristics more 
common to popular literature, suggesting a bias against other modes of 
representation, such as “conceptual,” psychologically complex, or round 
characters.268 While flat characters are important in their own right, they 
ought not to receive favored treatment under copyright law.269 
In conclusion, both the preference for visual over literary 
characters outlined in Parts III.A and III.B and the “distinctive 
delineation” test push literary production in the direction of being as 
visually memorable as possible, even if characters are to be rendered 
solely through words. Copyright law’s protection for characters imports 
aesthetic preferences for particular kinds of characters in several discrete 
ways. The preference for visual over verbal works is unjustified, and the 
 
 264 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 
(2012). 
 265 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 266 JAMES WOOD, HOW FICTION WORKS 96 (2008) (describing the tendency to portray 
characters in flat, lifeless manner: “The unpracticed novelist cleaves to the static, because it is so 
much easier to describe than the mobile: it is getting these people out of the aspic of arrest and 
mobilized in a scene that is hard.”). 
 267 FORSTER, supra note 95, at 103–04. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. at 108. 
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terminology used to express that preference (“word portraits”) is 
unclear and misguided. Further, the “distinctive delineation” 
requirement for independent character protection creates incentives for 
characters that will skew towards a particular aesthetic and will result—
at least in theory—in the creation of characters that are more flat than 
round. It may be that copyright should revisit Bleistein’s aesthetic non-
discrimination principle as part of a systematic reform of the scope and 
purpose of the derivative work right, where it does (or claims to do) a 
great deal of work.270 Unless and until such review transpires, however, 
literature helps illuminate the ways in which copyright law overtly and 
subtly encourages the creation of particular forms of artistic creation 
despite its claim to aesthetic neutrality. 
D.     Acknowledging the Fixation Hurdle 
Judge Posner’s view in Gaiman suggests that literary images admit 
of a number of different modes of recognition with respect to characters; 
they are unstable signs. To put it in semiotic terms, literary characters, 
under the Posner view, offer textual signifieds whose signifiers may be 
quite mobile or allow a great deal of “play.” A number of different 
actors, after all, have played James Bond, and in so doing they prove that 
the literary James Bond whom Ian Fleming created can and must 
conjure one image (indeed many images) for his readers, while the 
visually rendered “Bonds” are merely additional, permissible visual 
interpretations (signifiers) of the literary signified.271 
Indeed, Posner’s view of characters as requiring interpretation or 
completion by readers suggests legal arguments that could arise under 
copyright apart from literary theories, though the two strands of 
scholarship intersect here. If the literary character must, in fact, be 
conjured up by the reader mentally, one might say the character has, in 
 
 270 Yen, supra note 227, at 253, 266–97 (arguing that courts should take explicit stock of 
aesthetic judgments made in the process of copyright infringement determinations). 
 271 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). Alternatively, one might argue that in our culture, the immediacy of the film James Bond 
has overshadowed the literary one, and that the semiotic systems are now separate but 
complementary. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY 68 (2008) (“It is through text that we elites communicate (look at you, 
reading this book). For the masses, however, most information is gathered through other forms 
of media: TV, film, music, and music video. These forms of ‘writing’ are the vernacular of 
today. They are the kinds of ‘writing’ that matters most to most.”). In that case, one might say 
that the Bond films create, all together a single signified (this was the argument in Anderson v. 
Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989)). Various 
different actors from Roger Moore to Daniel Craig then incarnate the role, becoming the 
changing signifiers that embody the signified afresh with each new casting decision. 
SAID.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2013  9:47 AM 
822 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:769 
 
a deeper sense, never met copyright’s fixation requirement.272 That the 
verbal rendering, in words, has been fixed, is of course not in 
question.273 Its career in the world of ideas and culture, however, 
depends if not on its “semiotic disobedience,” at least on its semiotic 
autonomy, its very lack of conceptual fixation.274 If Posner’s theory of 
character completion is pursued to its logical conclusion, literary 
characters (and any characters requiring mental completion by those 
who perceive them) should perhaps be viewed as not properly “fixed” 
for the purposes of copyright protection, and thus not independently 
copyrightable.275 The very existence in both law and literature of two 
ways to approach the texts at issue—external and internal, in literary 
terms; extrinsic and intrinsic, in legal terms—further implies the work 
done subjectively in the course of apprehending characters.276 There is 
no one natural way to “read” a character. Thus a verbally rendered 
character might be fixed in words as part of a literary text that is 
copyrightable as a text. However, that text’s character might be said to 
lack the necessary fixation to qualify for independent copyright 
protection since how a reader interprets the verbal text to produce a 
mental image of that character is largely particular to the reader, and not 
fixed anywhere. 
Recall that a threshold requirement for copyright protection is that 
a work be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”277 To be 
considered “fixed,” a work must be “sufficiently permanent or 
stable . . . to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”278 Complex issues arise when 
a work is fixed in only fleeting fashion, or when a work changes, as a 
part of its nature or design. For example, in their earliest days, computer 
games posed a doctrinal puzzle: were ephemeral audiovisual displays 
 
 272 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” (emphasis added)). 
 273 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 (“Under 
the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be—whether 
it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, 
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, 
magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means 
of any machine or device ‘now known or later developed.’”). 
 274 Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489 (2006). 
 275 Indeed, under one literary view of characters, making any meaning at all out of 
characters requires acts of interpretation and relies on “the audience’s accustomed expectations 
regarding components of a narrative,” which suggests that in fact characters achieve their fullest 
signification only in the minds of readers and viewers. Ira Newman, Virtual People: Fictional 
Characters through the Frames of Reality, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 73, 75–76 (2009). 
 276 Id. at 75; see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 277 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 278 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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produced by videogames not copyrightable because they failed to satisfy 
the fixation requirement?279 In Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic 
International, Inc., the Third Circuit answered that question in the 
negative, holding that the audiovisual displays of video games were 
protected under the 1976 Copyright Act.280 
Yet the court’s reasoning emphasized that it was the repetitive 
nature of these transient displays that led it to conclude that they were 
“sufficiently permanent or stable . . . to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for more than [a] . . . transitory” period.281 
Similarly, in Stern Electronics, it was the “repetitive sequence of images” 
that led to a finding of sufficient fixation to justify copyright 
protection.282 In some sense, these courts turned to repetitiveness as a 
proxy for fixation; the displays recurred with sufficient regularity that 
they might as well have been considered fixed. Put another way, one 
could conclude that these images were constructively fixed. 
The courts in Stern and Williams were not troubled by the fact that 
these products were ones designed to change to some degree every 
single time the games were played, because the displays were changing 
from game to game only very little, if at all. The emphasis was on 
repetition and predictability. By contrast, in a more recent copyright 
decision, a court decided the issue of whether a work of art could be said 
to be fixed given that it had been designed with awareness and 
expectation of the work’s undergoing subsequent changes. The work 
was a garden designed by Chapman Kelley for the city of Chicago. Kelley 
v. Chicago Park District raised the question of whether a garden can be 
considered a work of authorship, and, whether it can properly be 
considered fixed.283 At issue there was also whether the garden was a 
“visual work” for the purposes of VARA (the Visual Artists Rights Acts) 
or a copyrightable sculpture, or possibly neither.284 Yet the Court backed 
away from the VARA claim by insisting that the garden was not 
copyrightable ab initio. The Seventh Circuit resolved the case largely on 
the fixation point, holding that a garden could not be deemed to have 
been fixed because the garden’s elements were “alive and inherently 
changeable, not fixed.” That is, the garden would change based on forces 
of nature beyond the artist’s control or intention. The court discussed 
this changeability in some detail, stating that the garden’s 
appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline for 
determining questions of copyright creation and infringement. If a 
 
 279 Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 280 Id. at 874. 
 281 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 282 Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 283 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 284 Id. at 291–92. 
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garden can qualify as a “work of authorship” sufficiently “embodied 
in a copy,” at what point has fixation occurred? When the garden is 
newly planted? When its first blossoms appear? When it is in full 
bloom? How—and at what point in time—is a court to determine 
whether infringing copying has occurred?285 
For the Seventh Circuit, it was important that the forces of nature could 
and did have a significant impact on the work’s ability to remain in its 
original state, and again, the opinion is worth quoting at length: 
Of course, the forces of nature—the varying bloom periods of the 
plants; their spread habits, compatibility, and life cycles; and the 
weather—produced constant change. Some wildflowers naturally did 
better than others. Some spread aggressively and encroached on 
neighboring plants. Some withered and died. Unwanted plants 
sprung up from seeds brought in by birds and the wind. Insects, 
rabbits, and weeds settled in, eventually taking a toll.286 
Unlike the audiovisual displays in Williams, the changing, unfixed 
aspects of the work were not ones that were repetitive and predictable 
over time. Here, parts of the original work actually did not survive while 
others thrived and changed shape and size. 
The Kelley opinion is well-reasoned and nuanced. Yet its 
implications are potentially considerable. It suggests that other works 
that also, by their nature, change after the author has created them, may 
not meet copyright’s fixation requirement.287 
Under Kelley, it is possible to argue that though a novel’s text is 
clearly fixed, its characters, beyond their expression as a mere collection 
of words, are not fixed. Characters, like a garden’s blooms, undergo 
“constant change” in the minds of readers. As the Kelley court put it: 
“gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden’s 
constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed.”288 
Characters—though clearly authored—are themselves in a deeper sense 
both “alive and inherently changeable.” 
The analogy between a novel’s characters and a garden design’s 
physical expression is not perfectly apposite, but it suggests some 
commonalities that could help clarify copyright in characters. Like 
characters in a novel, the garden in its final artistic state was one that 
continued to evolve over time, in unpredictable ways. Its origins, like 
those of characters, were fixed. A character’s origins lie in a novel 
comprising the author’s fixed expression of a variety of authorial 
influences, ideas, and experiences. The character’s text is fixed. Yet the 
things created by the text—perceptions and memories in the minds of 
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readers—the way the characters are brought to life by readers, those are 
not and cannot be fixed. Recall the neuroscientist’s description of 
reading: characters run “on minds of readers just as computer 
simulations run on computers.”289 
Similarly, the garden’s final state exists only because of its origins 
in a design that was fixed in a drawing or set of plans. That design or 
drawing may have reflected both copyrightable aspects and 
noncopyrightable aspects (such as what sorts of flowers can grow in 
what kinds of conditions; or where the light is strongest in parts of the 
park; these are facts, and not copyrightable creative expression). Yet the 
design is clearly a work distinct from the garden just as the book of 
accounting forms in Baker v. Selden was a distinct (and copyrightable) 
work even though the underlying accounting system was not 
copyrightable. That design was then executed in three dimensions in the 
actual physical space the garden would occupy. Upon the garden’s 
completion, from the time it was subject to external forces such as 
weather, other flora, and fauna, it lost any claim to being fixed because it 
became subject to change that would not be repetitive and predictable. 
Just as, per Robert Frost’s poem, “nothing gold can stay,” no garden will 
stay in its original designed form unless it is rigorously policed for 
change.290 Gardens grow, and growth is the antithesis of fixedness. 
Yet the militant horticultural grooming necessary to prevent 
change to a garden marks the end of the usefulness of the analogy 
between a garden’s changing blooms and a novel’s evolving characters. 
It would be not only impossible to guard against changes to characters, 
it would make novels incomprehensible. Characters can live in readers’ 
minds only because readers take them and internalize them and make 
them their own. 
In her work on characters in literary theory, Suzanne Keen has 
advocated for greater reliance on reader response theory and greater 
engagement with actual readers in terms of their emotional engagement. 
Keen shows that very little is needed in terms of character clues to begin 
a process of engagement from which readers imagine and complete 
their characters, in a process she describes as “the gap-filling fantasizing 
by which most readers flesh out fictional characters from scant verbal 
cues.”291 By that same token, readers will experience a range of 
heterogeneous responses when they make affective judgments about 
characters: they “will make a variety of judgments about the same 
fictional character: some will find a character more whole, while others 
will see a fragmented figure; some will make a case for a stylized, 
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symbolic reading, while others recognize a natural, literal rendering of 
the very same character.”292 Keen’s view builds, of course, on the 
theoretical foundations of reader response theory, which was the school 
of literary studies responsible for shifting focus onto the reader as an 
agent of textual interpretation. The insights from reader response theory 
make sense of how it could be that different readers can have such 
different experiences reading the same text, by suggesting that readers 
engage in a heterogeneous textual process of meaning making.293 
In short, readers do a lot of work to make characters make sense 
for themselves. A cynical (or theoretically outmoded) view of characters 
is that they are merely mimetic structures that reflect humans’ base 
desires to see themselves.294 They thrive on our recognition and they 
cater to our narcissism. Hélène Cixous writes: 
By definition, a “character,” preconceived or created by an author, is 
to be figured out, understood, read: he is presented, offered up to 
interpretation, with the prospect of a traditional reading that seeks its 
satisfaction at the level of a potential identification with such and 
such a “personage,” the reader entering into commerce with the book 
on condition that he be assured of getting paid back, that is, 
recompensed by another who is sufficiently similar to or different 
from him—such that the reader is upheld, by comparison or in 
combination with a personage, in the representation that he wishes 
to have of himself. 295 
Whether that view, rooted in psychoanalytical analysis, tells the right 
story about the work readers do in making their characters, it is 
certainly right in its point that characters do require some decoding and 
some recognition on the part of their readers. That readerly work turns 
out, just as Judge Posner’s intuition in Gaiman hinted, to hold 
important insights for copyright law. 
The distinction between characters fixed in a copyrightable text 
and characters in their post-textual afterlife is not simply academic. In 
the case of the latter, independent copyright protection should not 
attach because characters would seem to fail to satisfy copyright’s 
fixation requirement. In turn, the fixation requirement is no mere 
formality; it serves two crucial purposes: increasing evidentiary ease for 
proof of creation and subsequent infringement, and distinguishing 
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 294 Hélène Cixous, The Character of “Character”, 5 NEW LITERARY HIST. 383, 385 (1974). 
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federal copyright protection from state common law protection (the 
latter extends to some unfixed works).296 
The evidentiary rationale for the fixation requirement is 
paramount for characters. How can a subsequent author be sure to 
avoid copying from an earlier author, given the independent lives 
characters live, and the additional and multiple meanings characters 
may accrue, in their post-textual instantiations? If Author 2 reads a 
work by Author 1 and finds Author 1’s character, Jones, deeply 
compelling, nothing in the law of copyright would stop him from 
naming his own original character Jones. Borrowing a name is not, by 
itself, infringing on an author’s copyright.297 If Author 2 were to borrow 
from Author 1 not simply the name, but many details from the text 
including verbatim descriptions of the character, or many textual details 
that embed the character, Author 2 would be infringing on the 
copyright of Author 1. The question for independent copyright 
protection lies at neither end of the spectrum, however. Somewhere in 
the middle, Author 2, perhaps deeply influenced by Author 1’s work, 
borrows something from Author 1’s character. Not enough to land him 
at the end of the spectrum where he would be clearly infringing Author 
1’s text. Yet he infuses into his borrowing of that character considerable 
new life, and, more importantly, many more layers of interpretation that 
bring that character to life outside the original text. To do so, he 
proceeds from an amorphous view of that character, one that lives 
outside the text and inside Author 2’s mind. Returning to the 
evidentiary problem, it becomes clear how fixation plays an important 
role by providing bright line rules about what counts as copyrightable 
subject matter on its own, and when. Outside the text, in the minds of 
their readers, characters should not be independently copyrightable 
because, in a very real sense, they fail to satisfy copyright’s fixation 
requirement once they have been removed from their texts. 
IV.     CONCLUSION: IMPLEMENTING LITERARY INSIGHTS 
Recalibration of copyright protection for independent characters 
could come in a number of forms, all of which could conceivably ease 
the problems in copyright doctrine that literary considerations 
highlight. Answers to copyright’s current confusion could address the 
convergence of trademark and copyright; the implications of the 
character entanglement and authorial style problem; the lack of medium 
neutrality in copyright’s preference for the visual over the verbal; the 
inconsistency bedeviling the threshold tests for character 
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copyrightability; or the fixation dilemma raised by verbal characters 
who require mental “completion” by readers. Correcting the doctrinal 
mess in which character law finds itself could help to shape the 
derivative work right, which is a subject ripe for copyright reform. 
Though the foundation of this Article, and its evidentiary buttresses, are 
plainly not meant to hold up an argument primarily about copyright 
reform, some implications for reform do flow from using literary tools 
and texts as the Article has argued, and these implications are worth 
pursuing in future scholarship. 
If copyright’s selection of characters is biased, and it rewards or 
incentivizes certain kinds of characters over others, copyright could 
theoretically be adjusted to try harder to be aesthetically neutral. 
Alternatively, since aesthetic neutrality seems implausible, copyright law 
could seek to be more explicit in its aesthetic biases. If it sought to 
eliminate biases, it could evolve in the direction of greater inclusion or 
exclusion of characters, in other words, by providing more or less 
protection. If it sought simply to be more explicit in its aesthetic 
proclivities and interpretive choices, copyright protection would more 
likely contract. By forcing courts to bring aesthetic motives to the 
surface, legal reasoning could give voice to factors that have in fact been 
at play without courts’ saying so. This airing of the doctrinal laundry 
would have salutary effects on the case law and could exert collateral 
influence on the interrelated spheres of artistic production and the 
public domain. It could help incent more authors to create works that 
feature characters that are aesthetically variegated (rather than merely 
flat), and it could free more downstream authors to use more 
preexisting characters to create new works. 
If the scope of copyright’s protection for independent characters is 
unclear, it could be clarified in ways that understood characters broadly 
or narrowly. But the broader the protection for the character (that is, the 
more the character can conceivably comprise, and thus the more of its 
surrounding work it can bootstrap for protection against subsequent 
uses), the more confusing and inequitable the law will become. 
Characters that comprise large amounts of the underlying work can 
eventually be collapsed into the text, thus vitiating the utility of 
protecting the independent character as such. This may cut in favor of 
minimizing the scope of protection in characters. 
Theoretically speaking, it is easy to suggest that copyright 
protection expand or contract, but of course the mechanisms used to 
achieve changes in scope are themselves not free from costs and 
potential aesthetic externalities. That said, a number of possibilities 
could be explored, either endogenous or exogenous to copyright law. 
Exogenously, the selection problem might be addressed through 
recourse to trademark law. If the distinctive delineation test remains in 
SAID.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2013  9:47 AM 
2013] F I X IN G  C O PY R IG H T  IN  C H AR AC T E R S  829 
 
place, copyright law could look to trademark law, which after all, has 
already internalized “distinctive” as a term of art, and has a set of 
established tools and doctrines for identifying it. Pushing that idea 
further, copyright law could insist that independent intellectual 
property protection for characters should in fact be limited to trademark 
law. Given that copyrightable works would still be protected under 
copyright, this might represent more of a doctrinal clarification than a 
practical one, but it could ease chilling effects around characters that are 
not also trademark-protected. 
Endogenously, another possible mechanism to explore is the 
rehabilitation of the Sam Spade, “constitutes the story being told” test. 
Though the test is much maligned, there are reasons for which it might 
actually present a more workable, clearer, and more aesthetically explicit 
standard for copyrightability, if courts are to continue to apply a 
threshold copyrightability test at all in cases concerning independent 
copyright in characters. It could be yoked to a kind of entanglement 
analysis: if a character constitutes the story being told, perhaps it is no 
longer separable from the work in which it stars. A character might 
merit independent protection if he constitutes the story being told 
because he is no longer merely a vehicle, or a functional aspect of the 
work. Then perhaps the standard could be introduced at a second stage 
of analysis as well: does the subsequent work’s allegedly infringing 
character also constitute the (subsequent) story being told? If so, the use 
might be subject to a more rigorous standard of substantial similarity 
analysis, or a rebuttable presumption against it might arise, that fair use 
analysis could address. 
Normatively, the Article has made two overarching claims, the first 
mainly methodological, and the second substantive. The first argues for 
the value of an interdisciplinary approach to copyright law. Literature 
can do much etiological work in diagnosing why copyright law is 
muddling character jurisprudence. It also helps with the prognosis: 
literary considerations predict continued confusion in the law unless the 
underlying issues—such as character entanglement and hidden aesthetic 
preferences—rise to the surface. The Article’s second contribution is 
more clearly substantive, and it suggests why courts may be confused 
and inconsistent about how to distinguish character from text in 
determining the proper scope of independent character protection. It 
also argues that the law of literary characters improperly contains 
aesthetic preferences in terms of which characters it selects for 
protection. Misunderstandings about characters contribute to the law’s 
doctrinal inconsistency and confusion. Literature suggests that it can 
make a case for its own value in the discussion of copyright law and 
policy, and that what it has to say could play a small but important role 
in copyright reform. 
